© Roger M Tagg 2010
Welcome to FROLIO – a new attempt to merge philosophy and the "semantic web" . This website is under continuing development.
Most readers, like myself, need some magic ingredient to keep them interested in finishing a book on Ethics. I certainly struggled for motivation to finish Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. This book is much more encouraging; it follows the cartoon style of others in the Icon Books series.
This book covers the many different opinions on ethics with both fairness and fun. However the reader should not expect a definite answer to the many problems, other than to say that, as humans, it is good for us to become more morally aware as history unfolds.
It's also very much a "Western" view.
Robinson poses 10 "central questions" as follows:
| 1 | Are there any differences between moral laws and society's laws? If there are, why is this? |
| 2 | What are human beings like: selfish and greedy, or generous and kind? |
| 3 | Are some people "better" at morality than others, or is everyone equally capable of being good? |
| 4 | Are there good ways of teaching children to behave morally? |
| 5 | Does anyone have the right to tell anyone else what goodness and wickedness are? |
| 6 | Are there certain kinds of acts (like torturing children) that are always wrong? If so, what are they? |
| 7 | What do you think is the best answer to the question "Why should I be a good person?" |
| 8 | Is ethics a special kind of knowledge? If so, what sort of knowledge is it, and how do we get hold of it? |
| 9 | Is morality about obeying a set of rules, or is it about thinking carefully about the consequences? |
| 10 | When people say "I know murder is wrong", do they know it is wrong, or just believe it very strongly? |
He also looks at a number of fundamental contrasts, like:
The book doesn't actually have chapters, but I have broken it up into pseudo-chapters in the highlights table below.
| Chapter | Page | Highlight |
|---|---|---|
| The tough issues | 3 | Lots of people say that we are, in these days, in a state of moral decline. People lament the lack of respect, not just for authority, but for other people in general. But moral crises have happened many times in history |
| 4a | We owe much of our "identity" and opinions to the communities in which we live | |
| 4b | The state may decide what is legally right or wrong, but the law is not the same as morality | |
| 5 | Some say individual ethics are derived from the community, others that society must be subservient to the goals and ambitions of individuals | |
| 8 | Although religious and legal taboos vary a lot between religions (and between political systems), humans tend to legitimize moral rules by mythologizing their origins, e.g. "God said" | |
| 9a | Only 6 of the 10 commandments Moses brought down are about ethics; the other 4 are about religious observance and ritual | |
| 9b | The reciprocity principle, "do as you would be done by", is found in many religions - it seems pragmatic enough. However that doesn't fully cover Jesus's moral code - we are meant to be more giving and loving, even if others aren't | |
| 10 | Religion on its own doesn't seem to be a complete and satisfactory foundation for human ethics. For a start, there are different religions (with different rules), some without a "super-personal" God, and there are atheists who still seek to do good | |
| 11 | Most of us don't torture children just because we fear a visit from the police | |
| 12 | Society may be responsible for many of the worst human evils, like war, repression and exclusion | |
| 13-14 | Can one be genetically selfish or evil, or even have a tendency that way? Or is the whole issue just playing with words? | |
| 15-16 | If we don't have any choice and all is pre-determined, need we take any blame (RT: or personal responsibility) for doing bad things? Examples: Hitler, Charles Manson, (RT: Nazi camp guards?) Does society force dominant peoples' norms on us all? | |
| 17 | What is ethically good varies widely from society to society - and from age to age. Examples: public executions (RT: and slavery?). And abortion? | |
| 20 | A problem with absolutist ethics: dominant cultures force their norms on other cultures, e.g. missionaries. "Naïve arrogance of eurocentric moral imperialism" | |
| 21 | Relativist ethics can go too far, e.g. we (in the west) would suggest that sati, human sacrifice, cannibalism, burying female babies alive etc are absolutely wrong | |
| 22a | The existence of a wide range of moral beliefs does not mean that they are all equally valid | |
| 22b | Absolutists say that relativists only look at what people do, and not at what they believe (RT: what they do is usually good enough for me!) | |
| 23 | Few absolutists (outside Nazi Germany) would have admired the very clear Nazi social rules, and few relativists would have objected to the Allied intervention in World War 2 | |
| 24 | Relativists say that moral beliefs can never achieve the status of facts (like in science). But they agree that they are important, and reflect the strong natural feelings that people have for others (RT: compassion?) | |
| History | 28 | Greeks had to look beyond religion to find guidance on ethics |
| - Athens | 29 | No-one in democratic ancient Athens was worried by the institution of slavery; we would be horrified |
| 29-34 | Philosophical and ethical progress in Athens was mainly a matter of discussion and questioning (RT: presumably they had time because slaves did the work) | |
| 33 | Socrates: once you get knowledge of the essences of things, you can work out for yourself what is good and bad. "No-one does wrong knowingly" | |
| 38 | Plato: "Morality is not a human convention but a part of the structure of the universe itself", so the "Forms" (idealized essences) are the true and infallible source of all human ideals. Only a few specialists (The Guardians) can ever possess this knowledge, so they should run things, like "Philosopher Kings" | |
| - Aristotle | 40 | Aristotle: ethics is a rough 'n' ready sort of business that has to be determined by ordinary practical men of common sense, not by ascetic "experts" |
| 41a | Everything is heading towards its own perfect destiny (i.e. Teleology). Human beings are fulfilled and happy when they are functioning well | |
| 41b | We should choose a path between extremes ("golden mean") | |
| 41c | Individuals are morally responsible, so must accept the consequences, including punishment | |
| 43a | People can be consciously wicked (unlike Socrates view that evil is only done through ignorance) | |
| 43b | We shouldn't confuse morality with self-fulfillment; one can do one without the other | |
| - Sects | 45 | Cynics (e.g. Diogenes): preached indifference to worldly ambitions and possessions, because we can't control them for long |
| 46 | Stoics (e.g. Zeno): we must accept whatever life throws at us with calmness and courage, and limit our wants to achievable things; passion makes us irrational | |
| 47 | Epicureans: seek pleasure in moderation, enjoy philosophical discussions; but if you want private happiness, keep out of public life and politics | |
| - Mediaeval | 48 | St Augustine: true happiness only comes through the society of the church; the state is a necessary evil to preserve peace and order |
| Christianity | 49 | Aquinas: humans should aim for personal fulfillment and happiness by exercising their virtues in a moderate way |
| 50 | Aquinas: secular laws should reflect "natural law" - as enjoined by God (RT: presumably 10 commandments, Jesus; what about Leviticus, Deuteronomy?) | |
| - Renaissa... | 52 | Machiavelli: any ruler, to be successful, needs "necessary immorality" as well as virtue |
| 53a | Modern equivalents: greed is good, my country right or wrong, it's dog eat dog in this business (RT: and "my company, or political party, right or wrong") | |
| 53b | Public and private morality could differ | |
| 54-6 | Hobbes: Human nature is basically nasty, so we need social contracts; also government contracts to enforce adherence to contracts. | |
| 56 | Nevertheless, many people aren't that nasty, and they do act unselfishly, show compassion etc | |
| 57-9 | Rousseau's romantic view that human nature is good, e.g. the "noble savage"; civilization is to blame for spoiling it all | |
| 58 | Robinson thinks "noble savage" is bunk (RT: Layard showed that some of the biggest mass graves of slaughtered innocents (as a % of the population) date from pre-Columban America | |
| 60-1 | Anarchists, "Mutual Aiders" and Sociobiologists say that morality has evolved from human nature without the need for legalistic frameworks and mutual fear. Humans are a mixture of good and bad, as are some animals | |
| 62-3 | Humans are less "programmed" than ants and bees, so we need some rules, since we do have the ability to make conscious choices | |
| - Marx | 64 | Marx claims it all depends on the ideology of our class |
| 65 | "Morality" as mostly expounded, is the ideology of the bourgeois | |
| 66 | "False consciousness" is the disguised interests of a dominant class, as above, Objective morality as such is an illusion. The revolution should get rid of false consciousness and substitute instead class consciousness | |
| 67 | Marx supposes (hopes?) that revolutionary intellectuals will remain uncontaminated by false consciousness, and be sure of their own non-capitalist moral certainty. But there is some chicken and egg here. And history suggests Marx's hopes were dashed | |
| - Utilitarian | 71 | Bentham argued for calculating total happiness "greatest good of the greatest number" for alternative decisions |
| 73 | With this approach, only consequences count, not motives; it might end up over-riding traditional moral rules | |
| 75 | Mill: we should prioritize cultural and spiritual happiness over physical pleasures | |
| 76 | "Rule Utilitarians" normally stick to a set of rules, but calculate total happiness in difficult choices | |
| 77 | Utilitarianism may over-depend on the assumption that what the majority wants is always right, and may trample on minorities and individuals | |
| 78 | A happiness machine (RT: or Huxley's "soma") might not be ideal; life isn't just a matter of grasping all happiness and avoiding all pain. Even ups and downs have value (RT: like dental treatment?). How reliably can we measure happiness anyhow? | |
| 79a | Living in a beggar-free society might be worth paying for | |
| 79b | All this still leaves the question: how do you persuade people to be good? | |
| - Kant | 81 | A moral act is one done through a sense of duty, not personal desire or inclination |
| 82 | Can't we combine the two? | |
| 83 | Someone who gives to a beggar casually is like a child who makes the right move in chess without understanding. The motive matters more than the consequence | |
| 84 | Kant's "categorical imperative": something is morally wrong if it would be no good if everyone did it | |
| 85 | The problem with this is that such rules often clash in practice, so something has to give | |
| 86 | Moral imagination: we should imagine what it would be like to be at the receiving end of our possible acts | |
| 87 | The Utilitarians versus Deontologists issue is between flexibility for special cases versus vigour of ensuring good morality. Both of these have some value, and may in practice often converge - but sometimes not. Examples: cheating in exams (converge); a brain surgeon and a tramp sharing a dodgy raft (don't converge) | |
| - Scepticism | 91 | Hume: we can't deduce moral rules from logic or observation, they are only (RT: consensuses of) human psychological feelings |
| 92 | Are statements with "is" totally different from statements with "ought" (or "is right, is wrong)? Some concepts contain an element of both, e.g. money, debt, homeless, father, torture, promise | |
| 94 | We can't really test moral statements against evidence (RT: in Layard's book, maybe we can look at statistics of happiness over a longish period) | |
| 95 | Ayer: all moral philosophy is language-dependent, and therefore pretty shaky | |
| 96-7 | Hare's "prescriptivism" says that moral language has a built-in logic of its own; it applies universal rules to specific cases (RT: is this the same as "deontic logic" that we have in information systems?) | |
| 96 | To be wicked is inconsistent, since if we were all wicked, the term "wicked" would lose its meaning | |
| 97a | Some fanatics might not go along with imagining being on the receiving end - they would say the law is the law and if it applies to me too, so be it (RT: see the example in the Hadith where a guy admits to adultery and asks the Prophet for his judgment; the Prophet says that he must be stoned to death like anyone else) | |
| 97b | Many so-called "prescriptive" statements appear to be more "descriptive" | |
| - Existential | 98 | Sartre: each one of us is totally responsible, so we can't invoke "human nature", "teleological purpose", "Kantian rationality" or being a "pain-pleasure driven organism" |
| 99 | "Facticity" may limit our choices. But otherwise, denying our freedom of choice is "inauthentic" (RT: The Sartre equivalent of Hellfire?) | |
| 101a | Sartre does say, however, that we should try and make our decisions fair "for all men" | |
| 101b | Often, one is just having to choose between conflicting rules (of a moral code or society) | |
| 103 | Post WW2, there has been a change in the focus of philosophy from knowledge to meaning, and as a result ethics has split from epistemology. Many people say that "ethical knowledge" is a contradiction in terms | |
| 104 | "Human nature" is a socially-constructed concept, often used as a persuasive myth by one group to suppress another | |
| - Freud | 105 | Freud: Lots of what is in the human mind is sub-conscious (RT: might be repressed, or a temporarily forgotten memory - or could be Searle's "Background") |
| 106 | Freud's 3-way divide (Id, Ego, Super-Ego): the Id contains our instinctive desires | |
| 107 | Freud's determinism (we are what our early childhood made us) could be used to wriggle out of personal responsibility. But we are not "moral robots" | |
| 108a | Lacan's post-Freud view: the unconscious is more "who we are" than the conscious is; "I am where I think not" (RT: I don't remember, therefore I am) | |
| Post- modernism | 108b | Lacan thinks that the unconscious is structured like a language; but language exists before we use it, so it colours any human identity - so the "self" is a dodgy concept |
| 109-10 | How come humanity descended to the holocaust (RT: and Stalinism, Mao)? (RT: the reasons given seem to depend on peoples' prior prejudices or models.) Perhaps people fear too much existential freedom and prefer "certainty" as offered in some package - even if the moral consequences seem appalling | |
| 111 | Too many philosophers put too much faith in reason alone. Lyotard: reason itself is a linguistic construct (RT: yes, for debunking illogicalities, or things that won't work. Of course reason has sometimes been hi-jacked, just like religion) | |
| 112a | Ethical language (according to Post-Modernism - PoMo for short) is merely an expression of emotional noises. Human nature is a fiction, and reason as a source of moral wisdom can just as easily be a source of efficient evil. (RT: isn't morality just a set of "conventions" within a society?) | |
| 112b | Language and its meanings are very fluid, but the powerful will try to convince the majority that there are stable meanings and certainties, and that they (the powerful) know what these are (RT: but isn't this inevitable where some people do - or are a capable of - a lot of thinking, and most do not) | |
| 112c | (RT: a random thought came to me at this point. A newly-married woman in my Tehran office turned up to work one day with a black eye. I thought: is this the reason some Moslem women use the Burqa?) | |
| 113 | Probably, most moral philosophers in the past have been playing their own language game. Protagoras the Greek sophist said "Man is the measure of all things". Nietzsche too thought it was all laughable nonsense | |
| 114 | What line ought we to take with moral system that we find repugnant, e.g. slavery, gas chambers (RT: stoning adulteresses, human sacrifice etc)? Is it enough to say, well that's alright in their culture? | |
| 115 | Where is PoMo taking us? Possibly towards a totally consumerist morality ("supermarket slavery"), with isolation of individuals, workplace slavery | |
| - Critical theory post-Marx | 116a | Gramsci: we don't have that much individual freedom, as values are imposed on us by family, school, church and media, on behalf of capitalist society (RT: not much difference under communism). So we regard the resulting moral climate as "natural" |
| 116b | Marcuse: capitalist societies thus make alternative views difficult to hold and express (RT: communist societies made it even harder) | |
| 117a | Barthes: "reality" and "common sense" are social constructs, engineered by a dominant discourse, resulting in myths (e.g. "the poor are work-shy", or (RT) "initiative is anti-social"). It's all a system of signs (RT: = semiotics?) anyway | |
| 117b | Foucault: it's similar with all knowledge and reason itself; they are used to oppress the weak (RT: so, don't be weak). If you don't follow reason or accept established knowledge, you are assumed to be illogical or mad (RT: as in Soviet Russia) | |
| 118a | Rorty's approach: we should indeed distrust large-scale moral truths and utopian visions, and take a Nietzsche-style to PoMo - be playful, ironically detached, pragmatic, and seek self-enlargement - aim to be a sort of clownish übermensch. | |
| 118b | Lyotard: there are no ethical "grand narratives" | |
| 119 | Bauman, Lyotard and Adorno were all hostile to political agendas of total order and naïve faith in progress and reason. The advocates of these agendas believed their own bullshit, and that's what causes absolutist and coercive regimes (e.g. Nazis, Stalin, Mao) | |
| 120a | Philosophers must take their share of the blame, e.g. Plato, Kant (RT: and Hegel) | |
| 120b | The sceptics were right; human certainty is impossible | |
| - Down side of PoMo | 121 | Probable features of society following PoMo: 1) the world will become atomized (Lyotard); 2) consumerism, aided by capitalism, will become a default grand narrative; people who rebel against consumerism will become the new under-class; 4) ethical debates will become single-issue (RT: e.g. abortion, immigration); 5) it will be a no man's land of indifference and apathy. (RT: isn't that like it is now?) |
| 122a | Because there will be no universally shared moral values, there will be ever more ethical confusion and uncertainty. Morality will become privatized. The only way left for thinking people will be an existentialist way; we will all have to sharpen up our act | |
| - Neo-tribes | 122b | There will be a need for more ethical debate (RT: presumably on specific issues and cases - there seems quite a lot in some newspapers and blogs already) |
| 123 | Bauman thinks we may get "neo-tribes" of people who think similarly (RT: including non-geographical or ethnic groups, as with Facebook etc; these have been called "virtual communities". This must be better than the collectivist utopias we have seen so far (RT: or totally atomized confusion) | |
| 124a | Members of these neo-tribes would all have joined voluntarily, would share certain values, their own language games and an identity to subscribe to | |
| 124b | Otherwise, post-modernism could well be a slippery slope to just as undesirable a society as the utopian regimes of the 20th century (RT: with a lot of crime and a drop in consideration for other people) | |
| Social | 125a | We might ask "do we actually need communities?", but it seems clear that humans are social beings |
| Ethics | 125b | Rawls wondered "what are the minimum requirements to ensure a balance between the needs of the individual and that of society. This might be addressed by Games Theory (e.g. Prisoner's Dilemma). (RT: do we mean society as a whole, or any particular society? I think the latter) |
| 126 | Rawls proposed a new form of social contract; however we are usually totally in the dark about what our future status in society will be. So we need to insure everyone against possible poverty, and keep the 2 principles of liberty and difference (RT: the latter implying that we don't want total uniformity) | |
| 127a | Some individuals are bound to become better off than others, but we need a safety net to protect the poorest - a "guaranteed minimum wage". (RT: that's where some countries (maybe not the US) are not far off now. But there ought to be some conditions for receiving the wage. And shouldn't it be applied world-wide, not just to citizens of rich countries?) | |
| 127b | The "trickle down" theory probably won't work in many economies | |
| Alasdair MacIntyre | 128a | Alasdair MacIntyre, trying to address the current moral crisis, proposed Virtue Theory. We should concentrate on the people we should be, rather than the things we do. We also need more focus on the community (RT: what is the extent of "the" community?) |
| 128b | By Virtue, he means those qualities needed to be a successful and "good" human being, in the sense advocated by Aristotle. The context for this may be different in 1) a small, threatened community; 2) a sophisticated city state (RT: like Athens - or Adelaide?) and 3) a global economy; 4) an organization, commercial or government) | |
| 129a | The ancient Greeks' moral certainty (RT: was that really so ideal?) has been eroded by sceptics, rationalists and utilitarians, the last 2 of which thought they had found the clue to objective ethics | |
| 129b | MacIntyre said that people in this world are divided into bureaucrats, aesthetes and therapists (RT: try this link - this idea doesn't make much sense to me) | |
| 130a | We are unstoppably communitarian, and communal life is held together by traditions, and the dispositions and virtues that these groups encourage. (RT: but the traditions need to be capable of evolving. Perhaps sport is a good analogy - we need both rules of the game and traditions of good sportsmanship) | |
| 130b | Following Aristotle, MacIntyre thinks we should habituate people into having good dispositions towards others, so that moral behaviour is instinctive (RT: isn't this exactly how British "public" schools used to work? Maybe they still do) | |
| 130c | Robinson thinks MacIntyre is a bit vague about these dispositions, as his only guideline seems to be "wisdom of the ages" | |
| 131 | The key may be to tackle the connections between personal and social morality. | |
| 132a | New Aristotelians have the problem that there are rival different traditions, e.g. those of theocratic Islamic states, the American Wild West (RT: and Hindu India) | |
| 132b | Anyway, as Marx would say, the "wisdom of the ages" is ideologically contaminated" by the interests of the dominant class | |
| 133a | Robinson thinks a balance is needed between scepticism and a pragmatic view of Aristotle. We should beware of those who claim that there are certain (in the sense of unquestionable) truths | |
| 133b | Aristotle maintained that Ethics was just a branch of Politics - and Rawls, MacIntyre and Bauman seem to largely agree | |
| Feminist viewpoint | 134 | Women are one of the classes that men like to force their systems on. This includes imposing views about the "true nature of women", usually tying them to domesticity. But are there any specifically female virtues? |
| 135a | Mary Wollstonecraft agreed that the idea of "female nature" is a device to legitimize male supremacy | |
| 135b | She also pointed out that biological sex is not necessarily equivalent to socially and culturally determined gender | |
| 135c | Julia Kristeva said that there is no such thing as "essential woman", and the notion of identity is dodgy anyhow | |
| 136a | Many women (RT: those who feel that there is a difference) feel that male-dominated societies have been aggressive to each other, Machiavellian and destructive. (RT: groups of women are not always immune from this) | |
| 136b | Virtues such as caring and cooperation should be regarded more highly (these are popularly regarded as female virtues) | |
| 138 | Maybe it is just that women's moral priorities are different because of what they experience (e.g. child bearing), so making war is more unthinkable | |
| 139a | Most moral doctrines have emerged from societies where women are subordinate; so where things stand today is not so surprising | |
| The envir- onment | 139b | Late PoMo capitalism needs to find a better balance between economic development and the hunger for profits, and environmental needs. A possible rallying cry is SHE - Sane, Human, Ecological |
| 140 | We certainly need a new environmental ethic, due to extinctions, habitat loss, pollution, climate threats etc | |
| 141a | Most mainstream philosophers are strictly anthropocentric, and so are religions | |
| 141b | Valuing simplicity and frugality more highly (e.g. Buddhism) might help | |
| 143a | Utilitarian ethics may in fact encourage care of the environment, but essentially for human interests and pleasure | |
| 143b | How do we trade off the needs of other living things? Are plants different from animals? | |
| 144 | Most people agree that it would be bad if the world finished up with no wilderness areas | |
| 145a | Humans are in the environment, not separate from it; we are partners with other living things | |
| 145b | Lovelock's Gaia hypothesis: it's our job to convince our "planetary landlord" that we are worth keeping as house guests | |
| Animals | 146 | Historical philosophers' views of animals 1) viewed them only from human interests; 2) assumed they had no capacity for thought (Wittgenstein said that depends on having language) |
| 147 | "Animal Rights" is a dubious concept, because rights tends to assume that a contract has been entered into. (RT: what about Human Rights? New born babies don't sign up either) | |
| 148a | Maybe Animal Lib people make the contracts on behalf of animals | |
| 148b | It probably is largely a matter of emotion; we are compassionate and don't like to see suffering or maltreatment (RT: up to a point: we still slaughter animals for food) | |
| 148c | Some people use a teleological argument, i.e. what are the function, purpose and destiny of an animal? (RT: this sounds human-biased to me). But just because we can do something (like males fertilizing females) doesn't mean we have a right to do it | |
| 149 | Animal rights is perhaps best avoided as a concept. Instead we should recognize that animals have needs, and give some importance to that. Some animals can certainly show if they are happy or not | |
| 150a | Many animals do feel pain, so we should appreciate this and try to avoid inflicting pain | |
| 150b | The utilitarian view is possibly better than Kant's reason (which excludes animals on the grounds that they can't think). Utilitarianism asks "but can they suffer?" | |
| 151a | Athenians denied justice to outsiders and slaves (RT: and Nazis to Jews); today, animals are in a similar position | |
| 151b | We should include "sentient beings" in our consideration, at various levels of priority (presumably lower than humans) | |
| 152 | Experimenting on animals for human benefit is a tricky issue | |
| 153 | Would we be prepared to do the same tests on incurable brain-damaged infants? | |
| 154 | Can we consider some humans as "non-persons", e.g. if they have no memory, are unable to make even simple choices, or are in a terminal coma? | |
| 155 | Would a chimpanzee, a gorilla or "ET" be counted as a person? A chimp is as good mentally as a 4-year old child | |
| Euthanasia case study | 156-7 | Dr Cox euthanased an arthritis sufferer at her and her family's request, but was convicted of murder - although he was given a suspended sentence and not struck off the register of medical practitioners (RT: a case where the law was not seen as the same as the morality) |
| 158-9 | There are many arguments for and against euthanasia; a lot of them are to do with the conditions under which it might be deemed ethical | |
| 160 | Two specific arguments are: 1) "slippery slope" (if we allow it once, people will expand its use uncontrollably); 2) "sacred human life" (actively ending any human life is intrinsically wrong). (RT: Madsen Pirie says that 'slippery slope' is a dodgy tactic) | |
| 161 | If society is to allow euthanasia at all, there should be clear rules (e.g. the Rotterdam rules) | |
| 162 | What if the subject is unable to choose, e.g. being in a coma, a malformed new-born baby? Is "brain activity" a valid criterion? | |
| 163 | Using a "pain or pleasure" calculation might not help a decision when there is no chance of recovery or "worthwhile life". And who is to decide anyway? | |
| 164 | Using the "let nature take its course" argument would suggest there is no problem in switching off life-support; one couldn't then sue the doctor | |
| 165 | A suggestion is that voluntary euthanasia at the patient's request should be OK if supported by two doctors and if there are 2 independent witnesses (RT: presumably not including anyone who stands to benefit in the will) | |
| 166 | An argument based on Kant's categorical imperative is difficult; the patient's views should have some force. Maybe the principle should be that it's OK if done rarely and specified extreme circumstances, so it won't set a precedent (RT: maybe abortion should be considered similarly?) | |
| 167 | A utilitarian view might say that it's OK if no-one else suffers; that's perhaps the most useful guideline | |
| 169 | MacIntyre or his followers might ask "what might a virtuous doctor do?" The answer might be, "judge each case on its merits"; blanket laws or ethical systems are not appropriate | |
| Conclusion | 170 | Robinson concludes: 1) older doctrines may still have some value; 2) utilitarian and happiness principles may provide guidance, but are not infallible; 3) Kant at least says "be rational and consistent"; 4) virtue ethics "what would a traditionally good man do?" might also provide input, but may be too vague (RT: for new situations that arise through human developments and technology) |
| 171a | Post-modernism (in its various forms) is largely responsible for today's moral crises (RT: also, I would say, the shock of the Holocaust and Ethnic Cleansing, Terrorism and Scientific/Technical advances) | |
| 171b | Being a sceptic has some value, in making us suspicious of: 1) charismatic gurus; 2) inflammatory political leaders; 3) all those who claim a hotline to the moral truth. (RT: I think this last one includes religions as well) | |
| 172a | We are in a pretty primitive stage of moral development. PoMo destroyed certainty, which may have been good because the pursuit of certainty has over history led to wars, persecutions and millions of death | |
| 172b | We need less ambitious projects, gradual progress and tolerance of "tribes" (RT: as long as they don't impinge on each other and cause conflict, and are relatively open). (RT: as a famous graffito says, "God is not dead but alive and well and working on a much less ambitious project") | |
| 173a | The Anthropic Principle: maybe our universe is one among many, but one that is structured specifically to allow humans to evolve | |
| 173b | The biggest threat to our survival is ourselves; we might easily destroy the human race through selfishness, technology and arrogant certainty |
Kings School Peterborough (UK) A level Ethics site
Index to more highlights of interesting books
Some of these links may be under construction – or re-construction.
This version updated on 17th May 2010
If you have constructive suggestions or comments, please contact the author rogertag@tpg.com.au .