© Roger M Tagg 2009 - 2011
Welcome to FROLIO – a new attempt to merge philosophy and the "semantic web" . This website is under continuing development.
This is a student textbook on Epistemology. It address everything in a very ordered manner. A lot of terms are defined. It would be useful to read this before Quine's Pursuit of Truth or things by Rorty.
Note: some links have been added, but many others are already included in my highlights of Morton's 'Philosophy in Practice'.
| Chapter | Page | Highlight |
|---|---|---|
| 1 - | 2 | Coherence: beliefs have to hang together, as well as be sensible individually. |
| 4 | Rational/irrational | |
| 5 | True/false; evidence | |
| 6 | Justified/unjustified | |
| 7 | Knowledge/ignorance | |
| 10 | Skepticism | |
| 11 | Errors: mistaken reasoning, perceptual illusions (e.g. mirages). | |
| 12 | Externalism: there are lots of methods of acquiring knowledge, e.g. evolution, intuition, cooperation - not just rationalizing. | |
| 2 - | 19 | Perception - is it reliable? |
| 22 | Empiricism: perception provides justification for all beliefs that need justification - but maybe the brain has to help. | |
| 24 | Foundationalism - see chapter 5. | |
| 25 | The 'other minds' problem - what do others perceive? | |
| 28 on | Experiments illustrating problems for pure empiricism, e.g. is a drawing a duck or a rabbit?; in a drawing of a transparent cube, is the 8th vertex in front or behind?; upside down glasses, wise babies, blindsight. | |
| 3 - | 40 | A priori versus a posteriori knowledge - what knowledge can we gain based on reasoning? |
| 43 | Necessary beliefs - are usually a priori, like axioms. | |
| 44 | Descartes cogito ergo sum. | |
| 46 | Kant's "synthetic a priori beliefs", e.g. arithmetic, geometry, that events have causes, that there are "laws of nature", that people and objects persist over time (these are all assumptions). | |
| 47 | Quine - there is no fundamental difference between synthetic and analytical (i.e. deduced) beliefs. | |
| 49 | Quine's web of concepts. | |
| 51 | Reasoning for destruction, e.g. paradoxes. | |
| 52 | Reasoning for exploration - what do we need to ask next? Reasoning for accumulation - to add to what we know. | |
| 4 - | 57 | Simple induction. |
| 58 | Hume's problem - additional evidence may weaken the belief, or evidence may not turn up. | |
| 59 | Goodman's problem - we have to assume a pattern to use induction; there may be alternative patterns. | |
| 64 | We also use induction against a large background of beliefs. | |
| 66 | Justification and safeness of induction. | |
| 67 | IBE = Inference to the Best Explanation = Ampliative reasoning = Abduction. | |
| 5 - | 75 | Fallibilism - the idea that whatever we believe, or think we know, could be wrong. |
| 75-6 | Avoiding error versus avoiding ignorance - different policies are needed. | |
| 77 | Foundationalism - that there exist basic beliefs that don't require any evidence. | |
| 78 | Holist/Coherentist - we can change beliefs when it makes the whole package fit together better. | |
| 80-1 | Jungle fallibilism (something amazing may turn up); Boring fallibilism (depends on what you mean by xxxx); Informed fallibilism (as we get better evidence, better instruments, distinguish concepts better etc). | |
| 6 - | 88-9 | Examples of when belief fails to be knowledge: 1) if it was guesswork; 2) if evidence was faked; 3) if evidence was tampered with. |
| 89 | Gettier's counterexamples - where something is justified and true, but it still isn't enough to enable us to say we 'know'. | |
| 91 | Lehrer's principle - the chain of reasoning must not have any false steps. | |
| 92 | Reliability - there is a good reason why the reasoning gives correct answers. | |
| 95 | Tracking (Dretske & Nozick) - belief counts as knowledge when it tracks the fact that makes it true. | |
| 96 | Missing information: means things you don't know. | |
| 97-8 | Defeaters: things you don't know that cause your beliefs not to be knowledge. (RT: for more see this IEP article.) | |
| 98-9 | Trust - on other people for information, on prior "facts" for reliability. | |
| 100 | Belief is knowledge when you can take it as something you can trust when forming other beliefs. | |
| 7 - | 104 | Knowledge is not the same as justified belief. |
| 106 | Externalism - many important factors are unknown to the believer (e.g. unconscious, intuition, social norms); as opposed to internalism = you can work it all out yourself rationally. | |
| 108 | Knowing how, where, which, who is not the same as knowing that. | |
| 109-10 | Knowing that we know, or knowing things without knowing that we know them. | |
| 111 on | Epistemic virtues (some are moral) - intellectual courage, honesty, self control, caution; respect for evidence, recognition that evidence is not enough; ability to keep and organize evidence; ability to think up experiments; ability to make useful hypotheses and gauge which is more likely; knowing when one may be deceiving oneself. | |
| 8 - | 116 | Psychological beliefs - what we think, know, hope, want, love, hate, remember. |
| 118 | There are 3 kinds of psychological beliefs: 1)what we know from our own experience; 2) beliefs about behaviour and action; 3) beliefs about other peoples' perceptions, beliefs, desires and memories. | |
| 118 | Argument from analogy - sometimes used for the other minds problem - is really induction. | |
| 119 | Behaviourism = arguing FROM behaviour TO our knowledge, rather than vice versa. | |
| 122 | Folk psychology - what we pick up from family and social upbringing. | |
| 125 | Eliminative materialism - folk psychology is a stop gap, and we will eventually understand the physical processes. | |
| 126-7 | Errors due to subconscious and repressed feelings - we misunderstand why we believe things. | |
| 128 | Dispositions (of character), occurrences (of events). | |
| 129-30 | Ascent routines - establish the truth bit by bit | |
| 9 - | 136 | Emotivism - something as good or bad depending on how we feel emotionally about it (e.g. "rape? - ugh!"). |
| Morals | 136 | The error theory of morality (Mackie) = right thing to say, but nothing that proves it true. |
| 137 | Moral beliefs aren't much different to any other sort of knowledge. | |
| 137 | Thick and non-thick moral beliefs; Thin = whether a given act is wrong (see p141). | |
| 137 | Kantian ethics - something is right or wrong if the same rule should apply to everyone. Utilitarianism = greatest good of the greatest number. | |
| 138 | Likelihood of reaching consensus: the colour - humour - witches scale - the first has high consensus, the last is largely bogus morality. | |
| 142 | Non-cognitivism: moral beliefs aren't really beliefs at all. | |
| 142-3 | Reflective equilibrium (J Rawls): holistic view, evolve towards it? Look at related situations, and look for coherence. | |
| 10 - | 154 | Bayesian/conditional probability viewpoint - evidence adjusts perceived probability. |
| 158-9 | Problems with this - difficult to quantify; depends on initial estimate of probability; Bayesians don't all agree. | |
| 161 | Background beliefs influence the force of evidence - some make evidence powerless (p 160). | |
| 163 | Naturalism - says that knowledge etc is just another phenomenon of the natural world | |
| 165 | Framing effects - prior probabilities and judgments depend on how the question is framed | |
| 166-7 | Fallacies (e.g. people may confuse a number and a proportion; also the gambler's fallacy = next time it must restore the average). | |
| 169 | Naturalism challenges theories that ignore human limitations and their capacity to cope with complexity. | |
| 11 - | 174 | 3 issues for the future are: skepticism v common sense; criticism v tolerance; grounds for belief. |
| 174 | Arguments against skepticism (as typified by the brain in a vat possibility) - surely one only needs to rule out the relevant defeaters. | |
| 175 | Externalism versus internalism versus naturalism. | |
| 176 | Context is often relevant. | |
| 177-8 | Rationality: compulsive (no-one should ever believe anything without sufficient evidence) versus voluntarist (rationality can only determine what is irrational to believe). | |
| 178 | This is all a lot different from Bacon, Descartes, Leibniz, Hume etc, who thought that there were easily grasped principles for knowledge. | |
| 178 | "The jury is out - and it all affects religion, science and common sense." |
Index to more highlights of interesting books
Some of these links may be under construction – or re-construction.
This version updated on 13th January 2011
If you have constructive suggestions or comments, please contact the author rogertag@tpg.com.au .