FROLIO – Formalizable Relationship-Oriented Language-Insensitive Ontology

© Roger M Tagg 2009 - 2011

Welcome to FROLIO – a new attempt to merge philosophy and the "semantic web" . This website is under continuing development.

Highlights from the book A Guide through the Theory of Knowledge by Adam Morton, Blackwell, 3rd edition 2008, ISBN 978-1405100120

Introduction

This is a student textbook on Epistemology. It address everything in a very ordered manner. A lot of terms are defined. It would be useful to read this before Quine's Pursuit of Truth or things by Rorty.

Note: some links have been added, but many others are already included in my highlights of Morton's 'Philosophy in Practice'.

ChapterPage

  Highlight

1 -2Coherence: beliefs have to hang together, as well as be sensible individually.
 4Rational/irrational
 5True/false; evidence
 6Justified/unjustified
 7Knowledge/ignorance
 10Skepticism
 11Errors: mistaken reasoning, perceptual illusions (e.g. mirages).
 12Externalism: there are lots of methods of acquiring knowledge, e.g. evolution, intuition, cooperation - not just rationalizing.
2 -19Perception - is it reliable?
 22Empiricism: perception provides justification for all beliefs that need justification - but maybe the brain has to help.
 24 Foundationalism - see chapter 5.
 25The 'other minds' problem - what do others perceive?
 28 onExperiments illustrating problems for pure empiricism, e.g. is a drawing a duck or a rabbit?; in a drawing of a transparent cube, is the 8th vertex in front or behind?; upside down glasses, wise babies, blindsight.
3 -40 A priori versus a posteriori knowledge - what knowledge can we gain based on reasoning?
 43Necessary beliefs - are usually a priori, like axioms.
 44Descartes cogito ergo sum.
 46Kant's "synthetic a priori beliefs", e.g. arithmetic, geometry, that events have causes, that there are "laws of nature", that people and objects persist over time (these are all assumptions).
 47 Quine - there is no fundamental difference between synthetic and analytical (i.e. deduced) beliefs.
 49Quine's web of concepts.
 51Reasoning for destruction, e.g. paradoxes.
 52Reasoning for exploration - what do we need to ask next? Reasoning for accumulation - to add to what we know.
4 -57Simple induction.
 58Hume's problem - additional evidence may weaken the belief, or evidence may not turn up.
 59Goodman's problem - we have to assume a pattern to use induction; there may be alternative patterns.
 64We also use induction against a large background of beliefs.
 66Justification and safeness of induction.
 67IBE = Inference to the Best Explanation = Ampliative reasoning = Abduction.
5 -75Fallibilism - the idea that whatever we believe, or think we know, could be wrong.
 75-6Avoiding error versus avoiding ignorance - different policies are needed.
 77Foundationalism - that there exist basic beliefs that don't require any evidence.
 78Holist/Coherentist - we can change beliefs when it makes the whole package fit together better.
 80-1Jungle fallibilism (something amazing may turn up); Boring fallibilism (depends on what you mean by xxxx); Informed fallibilism (as we get better evidence, better instruments, distinguish concepts better etc).
6 -88-9Examples of when belief fails to be knowledge: 1) if it was guesswork; 2) if evidence was faked; 3) if evidence was tampered with.
 89 Gettier's counterexamples - where something is justified and true, but it still isn't enough to enable us to say we 'know'.
 91 Lehrer's principle - the chain of reasoning must not have any false steps.
 92Reliability - there is a good reason why the reasoning gives correct answers.
 95Tracking (Dretske & Nozick) - belief counts as knowledge when it tracks the fact that makes it true.
 96Missing information: means things you don't know.
 97-8Defeaters: things you don't know that cause your beliefs not to be knowledge. (RT: for more see this IEP article.)
 98-9Trust - on other people for information, on prior "facts" for reliability.
 100Belief is knowledge when you can take it as something you can trust when forming other beliefs.
7 -104Knowledge is not the same as justified belief.
 106Externalism - many important factors are unknown to the believer (e.g. unconscious, intuition, social norms); as opposed to internalism = you can work it all out yourself rationally.
 108Knowing how, where, which, who is not the same as knowing that.
 109-10Knowing that we know, or knowing things without knowing that we know them.
 111 onEpistemic virtues (some are moral) - intellectual courage, honesty, self control, caution; respect for evidence, recognition that evidence is not enough; ability to keep and organize evidence; ability to think up experiments; ability to make useful hypotheses and gauge which is more likely; knowing when one may be deceiving oneself.
8 -116Psychological beliefs - what we think, know, hope, want, love, hate, remember.
 118There are 3 kinds of psychological beliefs: 1)what we know from our own experience; 2) beliefs about behaviour and action; 3) beliefs about other peoples' perceptions, beliefs, desires and memories.
 118Argument from analogy - sometimes used for the other minds problem - is really induction.
 119Behaviourism = arguing FROM behaviour TO our knowledge, rather than vice versa.
 122Folk psychology - what we pick up from family and social upbringing.
 125Eliminative materialism - folk psychology is a stop gap, and we will eventually understand the physical processes.
 126-7Errors due to subconscious and repressed feelings - we misunderstand why we believe things.
 128Dispositions (of character), occurrences (of events).
 129-30Ascent routines - establish the truth bit by bit
9 -136Emotivism - something as good or bad depending on how we feel emotionally about it (e.g. "rape? - ugh!").
Morals136The error theory of morality (Mackie) = right thing to say, but nothing that proves it true.
 137Moral beliefs aren't much different to any other sort of knowledge.
 137Thick and non-thick moral beliefs; Thin = whether a given act is wrong (see p141).
 137Kantian ethics - something is right or wrong if the same rule should apply to everyone. Utilitarianism = greatest good of the greatest number.
 138Likelihood of reaching consensus: the colour - humour - witches scale - the first has high consensus, the last is largely bogus morality.
 142Non-cognitivism: moral beliefs aren't really beliefs at all.
 142-3Reflective equilibrium (J Rawls): holistic view, evolve towards it? Look at related situations, and look for coherence.
10 -154Bayesian/conditional probability viewpoint - evidence adjusts perceived probability.
 158-9Problems with this - difficult to quantify; depends on initial estimate of probability; Bayesians don't all agree.
 161Background beliefs influence the force of evidence - some make evidence powerless (p 160).
 163Naturalism - says that knowledge etc is just another phenomenon of the natural world
 165Framing effects - prior probabilities and judgments depend on how the question is framed
 166-7Fallacies (e.g. people may confuse a number and a proportion; also the gambler's fallacy =  next time it must restore the average).
 169Naturalism challenges theories that ignore human limitations and their capacity to cope with complexity.
11 -1743 issues for the future are: skepticism v common sense; criticism v tolerance; grounds for belief.
 174Arguments against skepticism (as typified by the brain in a vat possibility) - surely one only needs to rule out the relevant defeaters.
 175Externalism versus internalism versus naturalism.
 176Context is often relevant.
 177-8Rationality: compulsive (no-one should ever believe anything without sufficient evidence) versus voluntarist (rationality can only determine what is irrational to believe).
 178This is all a lot different from Bacon, Descartes, Leibniz, Hume etc, who thought that there were easily grasped principles for knowledge.
 178"The jury is out - and it all affects religion, science and common sense."

Links

Index to more highlights of interesting books

FROLIO home page

Some of these links may be under construction – or re-construction.

This version updated on 13th January 2011

If you have constructive suggestions or comments, please contact the author rogertag@tpg.com.au .