Review of John R. Searle Rationality
in Action
(Review originally published in 2005 Journal of
Consciousness Studies 9(2), 92-94:
journal web page: http://www.imprint.co.uk/jcs.html)
In
this book, John Searle makes a significant contribution to the philosophy of
rational action, and its implications for the problem of free will. The book also marks a change in Searle’s
thinking since his 1992 book The Rediscovery of the Mind, particularly
in that he now leaves open, as a reasonable possibility, that consciousness may
be able to cause things that cannot be fully explained by the causal behaviour
of neurons: for me, a step in the right
direction (cf. Hodgson 1994). Searle
also for the first time supports a non-Humean notion of the self, as an entity
that can, as a whole, consciously try to do things.
The main focus of the book, however, is an attack on
what Searle calls the ‘Classical Model’ of human rationality and the
construction of an alternative model.
At the heart of the Classical Model, according to
Searle, are the related ideas that actions are caused by beliefs and desires,
that primary or ultimate desires are not themselves subject to rational
constraints, and that rationality in practical reasoning is a matter of
devising means to satisfy these desires.
Other aspects of this model are (1) that primary desires are supposed to
be consistent, (2) that rationality is a matter of following rules, and (3)
that weakness of the will can only arise where something is wrong with the
psychological antecedents of action. In
Chapter 1, Searle discusses these ideas and argues against them in his
customary forthright and robust fashion, introducing on the way a central theme
of the book, that the operation of rational decision-making pre-supposes a gap
between the reasons for a decision and the decision itself. He recognises the need to justify an
alternative theory, and undertakes that task in the remainder of the book.
Chapter 2 lays some groundwork for this enterprise, by
discussing what Searle calls the basic structure of intentionality, action, and
meaning. After discussing intentional
states and their conditions of satisfaction and directions of fit, he returns
to the gap, and notes that there are in fact three gaps: (1) between reasons and prior intention to
act; (2) between prior intention to act and ‘intention-in-action’; and (3)
between initiating intention-in-action and carrying it through to conclusion.
Chapter 3 continues the discussion of the gap, and
argues that the intelligibility of what happens in the gap requires an
irreducible non-Humean notion of the self, an entity that (1) is conscious, (2)
persists through time, (3) operates with reasons under constraints of
rationality, (4) is capable of deciding upon, initiating, and carrying out
actions under the presupposition of freedom, and (5) is responsible for at
least some of its behaviour. Reasons
acted upon by such an entity, Searle argues, do not causally determine the
action, and yet do provide an adequate explanation of it.
In Chapter 4, Searle discusses the logical structure
of reasons, arguing inter alia that they (1) have propositional structure, (2)
must relate to what they are reasons for, (3) must, if they are to function in
an agent’s deliberation and explain an action, be part of a total reason for
the action and be internal to the agent, but, if the deliberation is to be
rational, they should also match reasons external to the agent (we should
recognise and believe relevant facts), (4) must include at least one element (a
motivator) that has world-to-mind direction of fit, which may be fully
internal (such as a desire) or may be external albeit internally-represented
(such as a need or obligation). Then,
rationality in decision-making requires recognition of relevant motivators and
appraisal of their relative weights, recognition and appraisal of relevant non-motivational
facts, and construction from them of a total reason for action.
Chapters 5 and 6 develop Searle’s contention that
there can be motivators that are not desires, not even desires to fulfil
obligations. Searle claims that use of
language involves a commitment to its generality of application in use by
oneself and others; and this in turn means, for example, that attribution to
myself of a need for help commits me to accept that such a need should
be attributed to another person in similar circumstances. Accordingly, if I recognise my need as a
reason for others to help me, I am committed to recognising others’ needs as
reasons for me to help them. Similarly,
Searle argues, we create desire-independent reasons for action by making
commitments by assertions (committing ourselves to assert truthfully) and
promises (committing ourselves to fulfil them).
Chapter 7 argues that Searle’s position deals better
with weakness of the will than does the Classical Model, and Chapter 8 explains
why there is no deductive logic for practical reasoning. (Searle notes a close connection between
rational constraints on belief and logical relations between properties, and
contends there is no such connection between the structure of desire and the
structure of logic.)
Finally, in Chapter 9 Searle relates the discussion of
the book to the problem of free will.
(The substance of this chapter was previously published as Searle
2000.) He quickly (perhaps too quickly)
dismisses compatibilism. He argues that
the psychological reality of the gap involves psychological indeterminism (a
complete specification of all psychological causes would not be sufficient to
determine the outcome), and that the question is whether this coexists with
neurobiological determinism (in which case the psychologically real gap
corresponds to no neurobiological reality and free will is a massive illusion)
or whether it is matched by neurobiological indeterminism (giving rise to the
difficulty of explaining how there could be causal efficacy which is not
deterministic). Searle does not answer
this question.
Searle’s writing in this book is characteristically
clear and straightforward, and I find his arguments very persuasive – although
this may be partly because they are very compatible with my own views! Particularly valuable are his attack on the
dogma that ultimate motivators must be desires that are independent of reason
and his analysis of the psychological gap.
(Searle’s treatment of the psychological gap has some affinity with my
argument in Hodgson 1999 that it is futile to look for a clincher in
decision-making, other than the decision itself.)
However, while the case he makes out for commitments as desire-independent reasons is interesting, to my mind it does not fully answer the question of why a commitment and/or recognition thereof does and/or should motivate action, independently of desire. I do not think this can simply be a consequence of the generality of language, as Searle seems to suggest: I think that some appeal to and recognition of the force of guiding moral principles is necessary (cf. Hodgson 2001). In any event, I believe that the position that we can apply rationality to at least some of our desires does not stand or fall by these arguments: whilst there may be some plausibility in a suggestion that reason has little if any application to desires like hunger, thirst, or sex, the position that all motivators are desires can have plausibility only if one defines desires widely so that ultimate desires can include such things as desires to fulfil obligations and to do the right thing; and it is highly implausible to suggest that desires of that kind are or should be unaffected by reason.
Searle makes out a powerful case for the view that
there is no algorithm for practical rationality, but sheds little light on what
makes for satisfactory practical reasoning:
if there is no algorithm, what explains how we recognise relevant
motivators and non-motivational facts, and appraise and weigh these reasons;
and what is it that distinguishes superior from inferior performances of these
tasks? Again, I think some guiding
principles are involved, not merely in practical reasoning but also in
plausible theoretical reasoning as well.
But it is not possible for one book to answer all questions, and I thoroughly recommend this book for its contribution to the philosophy of practical reasoning.
References
Hodgson, D. (1994),
‘Why Searle hasn’t rediscovered the mind’, Journal of Consciousness Studies
1, 264-74.
Hodgson, D. (1999),
‘Hume’s mistake’, in Libet, B., Freeman, A., and Sutherland, K. (eds) The
Volitional Brain (Thorverton:
Imprint Academic).
Hodgson, D. (2001), ‘Constraint, empowerment, and
guidance: a conjectural classification
of laws of nature’, Philosophy 76, 341-70.
Searle, J. R. (1992), The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge
MA: MIT).
Searle,
J. R. (2000), ‘Consciousness, free action and the brain’, Journal of
Consciousness Studies 7, 3-22.
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