DAWKINS AND THE MORALITY OF THE BIBLE
Article
first published in Quadrant 436 (May 2007), 38-43
DAVID
HODGSON[1]
Most of the published
responses to The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins have focussed on his
atheism, and have either given general support to his ideas or else dismissed
them as extreme and simplistic. They
have not given much attention to something I think is significant in the book,
namely its clear and forceful criticism of the morality of aspects of
major religions, including Christianity and Judaism, criticism that deserves to
be taken seriously by reasonable adherents of these religions.
I see this as a
notable omission. Many of the central
stories of the Bible attribute to God and God’s followers actions of grossly
immoral violence. I do not believe the
immorality in these stories has been adequately recognised by Christians and
Jews; and in this article, I argue that this has serious implications and
should be remedied.
Another notable omission from responses to the book is any
reasoned identification of weaknesses in Dawkins’ arguments for atheism; and in
this article I also set out what I see as the three main weaknesses of his
position. I will start with this, to
make it clear that my concern about the morality of the Bible is associated
with respect for religion, not opposition to it.
Dawkins (pp13-14) adopts the
following statement of atheistic belief by Julian Baggini:
Although there is only one
kind of stuff in the universe and it is physical, out of this stuff comes
minds, beauty, emotions, moral values – in short, the full gamut of phenomena
that gives richness to human life.
He goes on
to assert his belief that ‘there is nothing beyond the natural physical world’.
Dawkins
offers an evolutionary explanation for our moral values in terms of the
advantages, for survival and reproduction of genes, of being prepared to adopt
and follow moral opinions and attitudes.
But as Dawkins himself seems to recognise (pp270-272), to give an explanation
of moral opinions and attitudes does not provide any justification for
them. Dawkins passes moral judgments,
for example about the God of the Old Testament (pp227-250), in such a way as to
suggest that his moral judgments are not mere opinions but have
objective truth or validity; but what he does not see, or does not acknowledge,
is that this requires an appeal to something beyond the physical and beyond
evolutionary explanations.
The question of whether moral judgments have any objective
truth or validity is a controversial philosophical issue; but I firmly believe
that at least some conduct is objectively wrong. This is partly because of the universality
of appeals to right and wrong, partly because of other reasons I will not go
into here, and partly because I cannot accept that my belief that some conduct
is wrong is just an opinion with no better foundation than evolutionary selection
and/or culture. To take an extreme
example, I believe that, quite apart from what the law may say, it is wrong to
torture a child for amusement. I cannot
believe this is just an opinion, and that all that could be said against
someone who does such a thing and sees nothing wrong in it is that they are
breaking the law, and their genes and/or culture must be different from mine
and those of most people I know. In
relation to conduct as appalling as that, wrongness is I believe a matter of
undeniable truth; and I challenge anyone who disputes this to put their
hand on their heart and say, no, its wrongness is only a matter of opinion
which can be explained by evolution and culture but has no other justification.
Now I’m not
suggesting that conduct is wrong just because God forbids it. It’s been said that if there is no God, then
everything is permitted. I disagree
profoundly with that. If our moral
obligations depended on God’s commands, and nothing else, I would see no
reason, other than prudential reasons, to obey those commands. It could be said that, because God created
us, we owe God gratitude and obedience; but then either the obligations of
gratitude and obedience must themselves depend on God’s command, or they must
be based on some moral imperative that does not consist entirely in God’s
command. If the former, then it’s a
bootstraps exercise; and if the latter, then moral obligation depends on
something in addition to God’s command.
What I do
suggest is that moral imperatives are binding on us because of reasons
underlying them, that the existence of these moral imperatives and reasons
means there is something about the universe and/or our relationship to it that
supports these imperatives and reasons, and that this something is beyond physical
matter and physical laws.
So Dawkins’
failure to appreciate the need for something beyond the physical to justify his
own moral judgments is the first of three major errors I believe he makes.
The second of
these errors is his disregard of consciousness. Scientists cannot yet explain what it is about brain processes
that gives rise to conscious experiences such as visual and auditory
experiences and feelings of pain, or what such experiences contribute to our choices
and actions over and above information processing that could occur without
them, as it does in computers.
Certainly, scientists don’t have the faintest idea how one might
construct or program an artificial system such as a computer so as to have conscious
experiences, much less to use them; and it would be absurd, even if it
were possible, to use pain or any other feelings to motivate a computer to
proceed in accordance with its program.
Many scientists try to dodge these problems by saying, quite wrongly in
my view, either that computers are conscious, or that conscious
experiences contribute nothing, that the brain’s information processing could
just as well be carried out ‘in the dark’.
In his book,
Dawkins mentions consciousness in just one sentence, as a gap whose bridging
might be seen as improbable (p140). I
believe consciousness is itself beyond the physical matter and physical laws
that Dawkins claims are all that exist; and its emergence during the course of
evolution requires the existence of something in the early universe that was
conducive to its emergence, something which I believe must go beyond physical
matter and laws as presently understood.
Whether or not that is correct, consciousness is a deep mystery, far far
deeper than the emergence of life; so Dawkins’ disregard of consciousness is a
major defect in his argument for atheism.
From that, it
might be thought a small step to personify these features of the universe, so
as to arrive at something like a traditional conception of a monotheistic God,
as a kind of superperson existing either in the universe or apart from it, who
created the universe and exercises some kind of control over it. To take such a step may lead to ways of
thinking about these features of the universe that are more inspiring than the
vaguer and more abstract ideas I’ve been suggesting. However, it is a step I cannot take, except to the extent of
regarding a person-like God as a metaphor for a more subtle and elusive
reality.
This leads me
to what I say is the third major error made by Dawkins, namely his failure to
recognise the inadequacies of language in dealing with matters near the limits
of our understanding. Language developed
initially in dealing in a common-sense way with everyday matters, and it is in
relation to such matters that statements generally have their clearest meaning
and may be considered unambiguously true or not true. But language is not limited to dealing in a straightforward way
with everyday matters; and when language is applied to other than everyday
matters, truth may only be a matter of degree.
I can give a simple example
from twentieth-century science. Prior
to about 1900, scientists would have confidently asserted:
All waves are periodic processes extended in space.
No particles are periodic processes
extended in space.
Therefore nothing can be both a wave
and a particle.
However, by 1930 it was
clear that photons and electrons displayed wave-like properties under some
experimental arrangements and particle-like properties under other experimental
arrangements. There was no single
concept in our language that adequately expressed what they were; and the best
description that could be given of them in ordinary language was that they were
in a sense both waves and particles.
Apparent inconsistency did not prevent this from being the description
in ordinary language that was closest to the truth; and according to the
pioneering quantum physicist Niels Bohr’s principle of complementarity, such
inconsistent descriptions were acceptable in cases where the incompatible
properties could not be displayed simultaneously.
Since our
concepts and our language are inadequate for photons and electrons, it would
hardly be surprising if they were also inadequate for God. There are deep mysteries about the universe
and about our place in it. In relation
to these matters, it is unrealistic to expect to be able, with our concepts and
language, to express the reality in a straightforward way. The best we can hope is to approximate to
the truth by metaphor. Because Dawkins
fails to recognise that literal truth may be unattainable in relation to
religious questions, he is far too ready to reject beliefs on the ground that
they cannot be literally true, and to be dismissive of those who think
otherwise, including theologians who strive to give adequate expression to
religious ideas.
For my part,
I believe religious beliefs can exemplify an appropriate attitude to our place
in the universe and may qualify as helpful metaphors for what is purposefully
creative about the universe. It is
sometimes claimed by atheists that it is hubristic for human beings to regard
themselves as subjects of interest to an omnipotent God. However, what I think is truly hubristic is
to regard human beings (and in particular oneself) as the sole source
and determinant of what is right and good, rather than as exercising powers of
discovery and creativity in a context of respect for values that have claims
upon them and are to some extent independent of them. And religion has inspired many, perhaps most, of the greatest
moral, artistic, literary, architectural and musical achievements of humankind.
But
Dawkins is certainly right in his assertion that religions should not be immune
from rational criticism. We must be
rational in making decisions as to what is right and what is wrong; and because
beliefs on religious matters can have a strong bearing on these decisions, we
must be rational in addressing religious questions, no less than in addressing
any other questions that may be relevant to our conduct. It is important that any ‘leap of faith’ to
religious belief be consistent with rationally-held beliefs about the world and
particularly about morality, and that any beliefs contrary to reasonable
morality should be rejected.
One response to all this may
be to ask what does it matter.
Christians and Jews do not support genocide. They do not demonstrate violently when their religion is said to
be violent, they do not advocate terrorism or the slaying of infidels, they do
not condone the killing of apostates.
Well, I think it matters very much. I think it’s reasonable to believe that
failure of Christians and Jews to repudiate the morality of these stories can
have significant consequences, both in their own conduct and in holding back
their challenge to evil beliefs derived from Islam. It is undeniable that moral beliefs influence conduct, and it’s
reasonable to think that beliefs that demonise the enemy and justify extreme
violence against the enemy contribute to violence in the world.
The truly
worrying thing about fundamentalist Christians and Jews is not that they
believe things happened that did not happen, like the Flood or the walls of
Jericho tumbling down, but that their beliefs must mean they admire the God
portrayed in these stories and the morality of that God. And this worry applies with similar force to
those Christians and Jews who do not believe in the literal truth of these
stories, but nevertheless believe them to have a kind of truth in telling us
about the nature of God and God’s dealings with human beings, and about
morality.
I was
particularly struck by the reference in The God Delusion (pp255-57) to a
study carried out by Israeli psychologist George Tamarin. In this study,
reported in 1966, he presented Joshua 6:20-21 to 1,066 Israeli school children,
aged 8-14, across a broad spectrum of Israeli social and economic classes. He asked them the question ‘Do you think
Joshua and the Israelites acted rightly or not?’ Their answers were categorized as follows: ‘”A” means total
approval, “B” means partial approval or disapproval, and “C” means total
disapproval.’ 66% of responses were
‘A’, 8% ‘B’, and 26% ‘C’. The ‘A’ group
made comments such as that ‘In my opinion Joshua was right when he did it, one
reason being that God commanded him to exterminate the people so that the
tribes of Israel will not be able to assimilate amongst them and learn their
bad ways.’ Even the disapproving groups
included comments such as that ‘I think Joshua did not act well, as they could
have spared the animals for themselves.’
This is just one study, carried
out four decades ago. But it has strong
implications about the beliefs of the adults who influenced these children, and
who might not themselves have given such frank expression to their views; and
my search of the Internet has disclosed no reference suggesting error by
Tamarin, or any different results obtained in more recent studies.
It is right for Christians and Jews to condemn genocide and
terrorism. But I suggest that to be
consistent they should, with no ifs or buts, squarely acknowledge the following
eight statements:
(1) It would have been wrong for God to order
Abraham to kill his son, as the Bible says He did.
(2) It would have been wrong for Abraham to set
about doing so.
(3) It is wrong to kill an innocent person
because you believe God has told you to.
(4) It would have been wrong for God to kill
children to induce Pharaoh to release the Israelites. (It would have been terrorism.)
(5) It would have been wrong for God to order
the Israelites to kill all occupants of defeated cities. (It would have been to order genocide.)
(6) It would have been wrong for Joshua and his
followers to kill all occupants of Jericho.
(It would have been genocide.)
(7) If Jesus believed that God had killed
children to induce Pharaoh to release the Israelites, it would have been wrong
for him to celebrate the Passover. (It
would have been to condone terrorism.)
(8) The Bible stories of Abraham and Isaac, the
Passover and the battle of Jericho were written by fallible human beings and
convey wrong messages about God and morality.
I have very
rarely heard even moderate Christians or Jews acknowledge these things. If they are not prepared to do so, then
their condemnation of genocide and Islamist terrorism involves double standards,
which may affect their conduct in one way or another. But if they would acknowledge them, that could bring closer a
time when reasonable adherents of all religions, including Islam, condemn
immoral ideas associated with all religions, including those derived from the
Koran. And that would leave those
Islamists who advocate terrorism, the killing of infidels and the killing of
apostates as an exposed and discredited minority.
I appreciate there is a great deal of theological writing on the issues
I have raised; but I don’t believe this either satisfies or obviates the need
for frank admission, along the lines of my eight statements, of the immorality
in what is actually written in the Bible.
The God Delusion has not made me an atheist, as
Dawkins may have wished. But it has
made me ponder and articulate these ideas; and in my judgment, on balance,
Dawkins is on the side of the angels in the quest for a more peaceful world.
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[1] David Hodgson is the author of two philosophical books published
by Oxford University Press, Consequences of Utilitarianism (1967) and The
Mind Matters (1991), and he is a Judge of the Supreme Court of New South
Wales. A selection of his published
philosophical articles can be found at http://users.tpg.com.au/raeda.