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What is God? Index of Attributes and Characteristics

This is an article I copied a few years ago.  I discovered it recently while going over my files from a few years ago.  I felt that it raised some interesting points worth considering.  The article is long but there are a number of bite sized topics.  Enjoy!

Debates and disagreements between atheists and theists tend to center over a single issue: gods, or at least whether or not any gods can or do exist. The is the one thing which differentiates atheists from theists - it isn't necessarily much of an issue, but it can be magnified by a variety of other philosophical, social, and religious matters.

Because of the fundamental importance of this one issue to all general discussions between atheists and theists, it is critical that those who participate in such discussions have a better understanding of just what it is they are talking about and why. After all, what's the point of debating the possible existence of "God" if no one has tried to come to some sort of agreement as to what they mean by "God"?

When a theist claims that a god exists, one of the first questions atheists should ask is "what do you mean by 'god'?" Without understanding what the theist means, the atheist simply cannot evaluate the claim. By the same token, unless the theist is very clear about what he means, he cannot adequately explain and defend his beliefs.

Who Cares? Why Defining God is Important
It might seem to some that discussing the nature, attributes, and character of a supposed god doesn't make a whole lot of sense unless there is some reason to think that this god or even any gods exist in the first place. After all, isn't discussing whether or not a god is omnipotent or omniscient just a waste of time if we have no good reason to suppose it even exists?

This critique is not entirely without merit because it can indeed be a waste of time to discuss the characteristics of non-existent things. Who discusses what color hair leprechauns typically have? However, it misses the fundamental point that we don't know yet whether the alleged god in question is real or non-existent - and we can't know or even speculate very far unless we have a clear idea as to what we are speculating about. Thus, the question of God's existence is a bit pointless until we establish what, exactly, we are talking about when we use the term "God."

Although that makes some logical sense, the fact remains that people spend a lot more time discussing the existence of God than discussing the nature and attributes of God - why is that? In fact, people do have some idea already of what they mean by "God," thus rendering discussions about God's existence meaningful to them. Unfortunately, it's not necessarily "meaningful" in the same way to the others involved in the discussion.

In other words, the term "God" may not carry the same meaning to all of those engaged in a debate about the existence of God. One person may be asserting the existence of one god while another person may be denying the existence of another god entirely; thus, they are just talking past each other, not communicating meaningfully. This is an example of a common problem: getting involved in a complicated discussion without defining and explaining the most critical concepts. Debating the existence of God is pointless unless people take the time to set some "ground rules," including what they mean by "God."

Although there is a potentially infinite variation in what people mean by "God," there are some common attributes which are often discussed, especially among those who come from a generally Western tradition of religion and philosophy. Because it relies heavily upon a long tradition of intersecting religious and philosophical inquiry, it is commonly referred to as "classical theism," "standard theism," or better still "philosophical theism."

Occasionally one might see it referred to as just "theism," but this is a mistake because that term is already used to refer to the entire gamut of beliefs in various types of gods. What we are discussing here is not theism in general but a type of theism - the type developed by a particular tradition of theologians and philosophers in order to explain a particular tradition of religious experiences. This type of theism and this understanding of God are not inherently privileged enough to merit the broad label of "theism," but they are common enough to merit specific attention here.

Of course, even that is disputed by those who contend that this purely intellectual understanding of God is weak and ineffectual, unable to truly explain and conceptualize the reality of God. The God of the philosophers, it is argued, is not the God of faith - and attempts to identify one with the other will inevitably fail to help a person understand, much less critique, the positions of the religiously devout. This is also another reason why we are using the term philosophical theism rather than just theism - we are discussing particular theoretical and philosophical concepts which may, but need not, impact actual theistic beliefs.

Nevertheless, even though philosophical inquiry is not the same as religious passion, it isn't possible to totally divorce the two. Faith in God, however ineffable it might at times be, necessarily involves faith in some particular god rather than in some other god - in other words, it relies upon assumptions about what this god is rather than is not. Granted, it surely involves more than simply asserting that God has this or that attribute, but it necessarily involves at least doing that much.

As soon as the theist makes assertions about faith and religious experience, she enters the realm of rational discourse and reasoned discussion. She may not have an entirely clear idea about what attributes her god has and/or she may have difficulty describing them, but the fact remains that her faith in her god rests upon beliefs about her god - and those beliefs are open to rational evaluation. They have become assertions which deserve to be critiqued and defended.

The attributes found in philosophical theism don't always seem to make sense and don't always mesh well with each other - this is probably because they don't all stem from the same source. Philosophical or classical theism has essentially two parents: the theological and philosophical ideas developed in ancient Athens by philosophers like Plato, and the religious ideas developed among the ancient Jews. These two strands came together and were worked upon over the course of Christian history, with Augustine and Aquinas being important figures in this process.

Because some of the characteristics are derived from the esoteric discussions in ancient Greek philosophy (like absolute perfection) while others are derived from the personal religious experiences of the ancient Jews (like God being a person), those characteristics have a tendency to conflict. Nevertheless, Christian theologians and Western philosophers have engaged in great efforts to find ways to make them compatible. Serious discussions about the existence of God and the value of a religion based upon belief in God really should take those characteristics and the attempts to harmonize them into account. Believers need to be aware of the ways in which they are weak while non-believers should be aware of the best arguments used as support.

God is Perfect & Worthy of Worship
Although there are a number of divine attributes which tend to receive a lot of attention, there is none quite so important for traditional believers as the general principle of absolute perfection and the more narrow implication that, therefore, God is worthy of our worship. These are, in many respects, the very reason why the existence of God is the subject of so much debate - if it weren't for them, there wouldn't be any religions centered around God and perhaps people wouldn't be divided.

The concepts of worship and perfection are deeply intertwined, each feeding off of the other and each influencing how the other is understood. The relevancy of worship is reasonably obvious, because gods have been the objects of worship for as far back as our record of gods goes. Indeed, gods have generally demanded worship and sometimes it was understood that humans were created for the purpose of worshipping the gods. But of course there is a question which people can ask: why should we bother worshipping gods?

Worship involves total and absolute devotion. If we truly worship God, then we have totally dedicated ourselves to God: we dedicate ourselves to God's praise, to God's values, and to God's purpose. There are no compromises and there is no effort to get God to meet us "halfway," to take our values or our desires into consideration. We worship, and that means we give up whatever of ourselves is required. But what sort of god merits such devotion?

The principle of perfection has been emphasized, at least in part, to answer that question. Over the course of time, people decided that it wasn't quite enough that a god be really powerful, really jealous, or really knowledgeable. Such attributes sufficed in ancient polytheistic religions, but even when they were still popular there were a few who questioned whether that was sufficient. Philosophers and theologians gradually developed a principle of greater and greater perfection.

And it wasn't just enough that God simply be the greatest being we could think of or just theoretically the greatest being. Instead, God, to be worthy of worship, has to be the greatest possible being on absolutely every possible level - nothing greater, in any fashion, can possibly exist. Thus, God is an absolutely perfect being; to use the language of Christian theologian Anselm, God is a being greater than which no being can be conceived (even by God). All of the other attributes of God ultimately tie into this one - God's perfection is so absolute that there is nothing more powerful, more loving, more knowledgeable, etc.

Unfortunately, this understanding of God is not without its problems. For one thing, it's a bit circular. The idea that God is absolutely perfect was partly derived from the premise that God is worthy of worship (no one really asked if perhaps God might exist but might not be worth worshipping); but now the idea that God is worthy of worship is based upon the premise that God is absolutely perfect. It's a nice argument, but if either premise is questionable (and they are), then the position collapses.

Actually questioning the premises offers us further problems. Even if God is absolutely perfect, why does that necessarily entail that it merits worship - our absolute, unfettered and unadulterated devotion? What is it about "absolute perfection" that requires, morally or logically, that we completely give ourselves over to this being? Indeed, should we even assume that this being desires our worship? Should we assume that this being even cares what we do with our lives?

Some of these problems rest upon what we mean by "absolute perfection," and it is not at all obvious what that concept means. In Eastern religions, for example, such perfection might entail a total detachment from all desires and concerns, because they lead to suffering. Thus, an absolutely perfect being really wouldn't desire our worship - or desire anything at all, for that matter.

Medieval Christian theologians like Anselm and even Augustine expressed something similar when they argued that an absolutely perfect being must be "impassible," which means being incapable of any feelings, but particularly sorrow or suffering. Although Jesus suffered on the cross, that was thought to only be the human part of Jesus which suffered - the divine experienced none of that.

However, not all theologians (especially today) accept such a notion. They argue that perfection requires that God be capable of empathizing with human suffering, and of course the capacity to empathize requires the capacity to experience emotions. Moreover, it is arguable that an inability to be harmed, to feel pleasure, or to experience suffering is incompatible with the characteristic of personhood as we understand it, another important attribute commonly ascribed to God.

This forces us to raise another important issue: if God is absolutely perfect, then we have reasonable grounds for thinking that the attributes of this God must be logically consistent. Inconsistent and contradictory attributes lead to an incoherent and impossible God, and that God isn't absolutely perfect, is it? Thus, even the attribute of absolute perfection must be understood as logically consistent with other attributes, like God's love and power, in order for God to indeed be absolutely perfect.

Is the concept of absolute perfection meaningful and coherent? Perhaps, although it is not quite clear what exactly it really does mean and that renders it suspect. Many people, including some philosophers, seem to gloss over it as if "everyone knows" what is meant, even though in reality the concept looks about as clear as muddy water.

Is the concept of "worthy of worship" meaningful and coherent? Yes, it is coherent and meaningful, but it is not clear that it is true - in particular, it is not clear that it follows from the assumption that God is absolutely perfect. It should be granted that it is at least conceivable how a person might move from one to the other; nevertheless, whether a theist asserts or denies that God is absolutely perfect, reasons for concluding that God is "worthy of worship" should be offered.

God is a Person: Personal Relationships with God
For many people in Western religious traditions, the idea that God is a "person" is a necessary and fundamental part of their beliefs. Indeed, the very idea that God might not be a person is almost inconceivable for that would render them unable to adequately explain their religious history and their own religious experiences.

One reason for this is the fact that many of things often thought of as contributing to perfection, like love, morality, and intelligence, seem only to occur in the context of persons. If God were not a person, it would be difficult to think of God as intelligent, creative, moral, or loving - and if God were none of those things, how could God be perfect and worthy of worship?

Another reason for this is the fact that there is a strong tradition of conceiving of God as a being with whom we can and should have a personal relationship with. Jews have a relationship with God because they are God's chosen people; although this relationship is more often between God and the Jews as a people than with any Jews as individuals, it is still a personal relationship from God's perspective, requiring God to be a person.

Christianity has maintained this tradition, making it even more important in the figure of Jesus Christ, believed to be both fully human and fully God. Because Jesus is obviously a person and because Jesus came as the savior for the entire world, he is regarded as someone with whom we can have a relationship personally, as individuals. Some Christians take this concept so far that they would deny that Christianity is a "religion" at all; instead, they say that Christianity is defined as a "personal relationship with God."

The idea of God as a person is not monolithic and uncontested, however. Outside the Western religious tradition, impersonal gods are quite common. In Hinduism, Brahman is conceived as the ultimate and absolutely impersonal "reality" which lies behind the illusion we typically think of as reality.

God conceived as impersonal is not limited to Eastern traditions like Hinduism, however. Islam specifically rejects the idea of God as a person as blasphemous because being a "person" means being limited and having imperfections. Thus, contrary to the Christian and Jewish traditions, the personhood of God is treated as incompatible with God's perfection. This is an important point to remember because Islam is usually treated as falling within the sphere of philosophical theism - clearly, however, philosophical theism can be incompatible with actual monotheistic traditions and with theistic religions as people actually practice them.

Then again, perhaps the Islamic perspective on God isn't so strange after all. Although the idea of God as a person has been generally dominant in the Western religious and philosophical discourse, it has not had a monopoly. There has been a strong tendency among many theologians and philosophers to accept the Muslim insight that perhaps being a person negatively impacts the ability of God to be perfect.

As a consequence, the notion of "person" as applied to God becomes less and less like the notion of "person" as applied to humans. Today many believers use the terms as if they meant pretty much the same thing, but philosophers and theologians often use them as if they were only analogously related at best. The idea of attributing to an uncreated God a characteristic of created humans sounds arrogant to some - perhaps God is more like a person than a non-person from our perspective, but that doesn't mean that God is a person in any way we understand the term.

Is the attribute of personhood for God coherent and meaningful? Maybe, maybe not. When defined much as the term is defined for humans, it is coherent and meaningful - but it may also not be consistent with other attributes. On the other hand, if we modify it to make it consistent with other attributes, we begin to lose consistency with what real believers think.

If a theist is going to assert that their god is a "person," it will be necessary for them to explain what, exactly, they mean by that word in this context. It cannot be assumed that they mean the same thing as whey they describe a human being as a "person." Whether they do mean the same thing in both contexts or whether they only conceive of an analogous relationship between the two, they will also have to explain what implications this has for the nature of God and our relationship with it.

God & Gender: Is God Really Male?
In many religions throughout history, gods have been portrayed variously as male and female, often embodying important masculine and feminine attributes. The tradition of philosophical theism, however, has had some difficulty with the issue of gender because of the conflicts between religious beliefs and Greek philosophy.

On the one hand, the religious systems which rely heavily upon philosophical theism have traditionally portrayed God as male. On the other hand, the absolute perfection postulated in Greek philosophy excludes the possibility of God having any gender, whether male or female. Under this conception, gender categories simply cannot apply to a being as totally "other" as God.

The influence of classic philosophy over time has caused religions like Christianity and Judaism to abandon explicit arguments that God is male. Nevertheless, gendered references continue to abound as people refer to God as Him, He, His, etc. Believers defend this by references to things like tradition or the fact that Jesus, the incarnation of God, was male.

English, however, does have the option of using "it" instead of male pronouns - but people don't normally use that. Believers object that "it" is somehow "wrong" when it comes to God because that pronoun doesn't normally get used when it comes to persons - but it is certainly no more wrong than the use of "he" because gendered pronouns aren't normally used when it comes to genderless objects.

If the use of "he" were genuinely the non-problem that believers so often portray it, then they wouldn't mind if people used "she" instead. Female pronouns are indeed used in reference to persons, so they don't suffer from the same alleged drawbacks as the use of "it" does. Female pronouns should be no more or less of a problem than male pronouns, but so many believers still object when they are used. Not all object, to be sure, but many do - and with great indignation.

Such anger makes little sense unless, on some level, perhaps people really do imagine God to be male and are offended at the idea of a male God being portrayed as female. Another possibility may be that they really do think that God is genderless, but regard male portrayals as positive or neutral while female portrayals are negative.

Either way, the reactions suggest prejudice against women, thus lending credence to the argument that continued references to God as male are simply part of a larger situation in which religion serves to perpetuate stereotypes about and discrimination against women. Arguably, gender-neutral language about God would serve to reduce the prevalence of both stereotypes and discrimination, goals which should be important for religious organizations.

God is Creator & Sustainer of Existence
A very common attribute of gods in religious traditions around the world is that of creation - our universe, our world, and indeed our very selves often owe their existence to creative acts of the gods. In the Western traditions of philosophical theism, the existence of everything is owed to a single creative act by a single perfect God.

The concept of God as Creator is not without its problems and controversies, however. One of the most fundamental involves the exact nature of how the creative act occurred. The most common is idea that God created everything ex nihilo - out of nothing. This expresses the important idea that God did not operate on pre-existing matter and is not an agent among other agents. Instead, God is the absolute origin of all that exists - all matter, all energy, and all organization.

God as the origin of everything is also used to explain the notion of God's absolute mastery over all of existence. Because everything was created by God, then God has authority over it all. To use Paul's analogy, "But who are you, a man, to answer back to God? Will what is moulded say to its moulder, ÔWhy have you made me thus?Õ Has the potter no right over the clay, to make out of the same lump one vessel for beauty and another for menial use?" (Romans 9:20-21, RSV)

Creation ex nihilo is not the only way to understand God's action of creation. Although a bit less common, there is also the idea that creation occurred ex deo, or out of the very substance of God. Under this view, everything that exists owes its existence not only to the creative action of God, but also to the very substance of God because all that is was derived from God by God. One modern expression of the doctrine of creation ex deo can be found in process theism, according to which the universe can be conceived as something akin to God's "body." This means that God and our material reality are not wholly distinct: God quite literally shares in our existence through our experiences of it. As we grow and develop, so does God.

Both of these conceptions of creation have advantages and disadvantages. Creation ex nihilo maintains an absolute distinction between Creator and Created, often an important feature of philosophical theism. Many feel that such a distinction actually compromises God's perfection, however. For them, perfection entails the idea that there can be nothing truly outside of God, even though there might be appear to be such a separation from our limited and flawed perspectives.

Creation ex nihilo also allows for the idea that all of existence is absolutely dependent on God while God is absolutely independent of our existence. This helps emphasize the radically different natures of God and the universe. Creation ex deo may allow for such a relationship, but as can be seen with process theism it also allows for a mutually interdependent relationship between God and the universe.

Whichever mode of creation one opts to argue for, it is also common to insist that God is not only the creator of all that exists, but also the sustainer of all that exists. What this means is that, from moment to moment, all that exists only does so because God wills it to exist. Should God stop willing the existence of anything or everything, then that existence would instantly end.

Thus, while philosophical theism has traditionally insisted on an absolute distinction between God and Creation in the act of creation, the distinction becomes very blurred when it comes to God's role as Sustainer - perhaps one reason why creation ex deo has remained a viable alternative to creation ex nihilo.

Is the notion of God as Creator and Sustainer of the universe coherent and meaningful? Perhaps, but because there is no single or obvious way to understand the act of creation or the relationship between God and the universe, any theist asserting "creator" and/or "sustainer" as attributes of God should be expected to explain what is meant by those terms and why.

  God is Omnipotent
At its most fundamental level, the concept of "omnipotence," also sometimes known as all-powerful, refers to God's ability to do absolutely anything God wants. This characteristic is usually treated as implied from God's characteristic as absolute creator. If God is capable of creating all of existence (whether ex nihilo or ex deo), it is felt that it would be nonsensical to then proceed to assert that there are things beyond God's abilities. Any being capable of creating existence itself must therefore be capable of anything at all - right?

Unfortunately, the most absolute sense of omnipotent has been found to be incoherent. If God were truly omnipotent in an absolute and unlimited sense, then God could be capable of both existing and not existing at the same time, meaning that every form of theism and every form of atheism would be equally justified at all times simultaneously. Such a God could be capable of informing humans of certain requirements for attaining heaven and avoiding hell but actually holding to entirely different requirements without ever actually lying.

Clearly, then, any coherent understanding of God and God's nature requires theologians to place limits of some sort upon God's alleged omnipotence. The first and most basic limit, designed to avoid problems like those described above, is that of logic: God's omnipotence means that God can do anything that is logically possible to do. Thus, God cannot make 2 + 2 equal 5, God cannot both simultaneously exist and not exist, and God cannot lie and tell the truth at the same time.

If omnipotence were God's only attribute, the logical limitations might be sufficient; however, other limitations have been found to be necessary because of the many other attributes which people tend to assume that God has. Without these limitations, their definition of God would be logically contradictory and it would be reasonable to conclude that God, as defined, cannot exist.

For example, can God sit down? Although some conceptions of gods in the past allowed for them to be able to sit down, classic philosophical theism has always postulated a non-material, disembodied divinity. Thus, it simply would not be possible for God to sit down - an apparent contradiction to omnipotence, especially since I am capable of sitting down all I want.

To consider another example, is God capable of committing evil? Or, to use a Christian context, can God sin? Once again, some theistic systems have imagined gods capable of all manner of horrible things; philosophical theism, however, has always imagined a perfectly good God. It is inconceivable to believers in such a god that it would ever sin or do evil - even though humans are obviously quite capable of it.

As a consequence, another common limitation to omnipotence which has developed in philosophy and theology is that God can do anything which is compatible with God's nature. Sitting down is not compatible with the nature of a non-material being. Sinning is not compatible with the nature of a perfectly good being. Thus, God may not be able to sit down or sin, but those aren't "really" contradictions with divine omnipotence because this new definition of omnipotence excludes anything contradictory to the nature of the being in question.

If that isn't bad enough, philosophers and theologians have found themselves devising a number of others limitations upon the definition of omnipotence in order to allow for many more things which God cannot do while retaining the characteristic of omnipotence. A detailed examination of these restrictions is left for another time; what is important to see here is that "omnipotence" has been whittled down bit by bit until there is very little left of the original concept.

Arguably, you and I are "omnipotent" under some of these "refined" conceptions of omnipotence that have become so weak. Any conception of omnipotence which could allow us to argue that we are also omnipotent has become a conception of impotence, especially when combined with the observation that we are capable of many things well outside the ability of this allegedly omnipotent God.

This isn't entirely surprising. Philosophers and theologians did not start with an empirical observation that God was omnipotent and then proceed to come to terms with how omnipotence should be understood in relation to God's other attributes. Such a context, if it existed, would perhaps allow us to be more sympathetic to the shifting sand under their feet.

In reality they have began with the religious dogma that God is omnipotent, inferred in part from the religious dogma of God's role as absolute creator, and then proceeded to redefine and redefine and then redefine once more (although these are usually described as "refinements," not redefinitions). This path is followed in an effort to harmonize one religious dogma with a series of other religious dogmas which are also redefined until somewhere, someone hopefully arrives at a set of definitions that don't contradict each other or anything we know about the world, but is still meaningful in a religious context. No one has quite succeeded yet, but that's not for want of trying.

Arguably, the original conception of omnipotence wasn't really coherent anyway - but as more and more of it is removed in order to make it safe for logic and for God's other alleged attributes, we arrive at a position where there seems little point in continuing to use the term at all. Is God all-powerful or just very powerful? The "refined" definition of all-powerful seems to be barely distinguishable from very powerful. The term all-powerful cannot be abandoned for religious reasons, but the concept has been all but abandoned in the details.

This may be one reason why some philosophers and theologians have come to favor process theism over philosophical theism. According to process theism, God is incapable of exerting coercive power over creation. Instead, God can at most exert persuasive power. God cannot impose divine will on people, but God can try to persuade people about what should be done - and then people will either agree or disregard God's advice. This limitation to persuasion includes an inability to perform miracles - just as God cannot enforce divine will on humans, it is also impossible for God to violate the laws of nature.

Classical theists have argued that this renders God less worthy of worship because, presumably, being worthy of worship requires an ability to enforce one's will against all possible opposition. Process theists, however, state that God's inability to impose divine will on the world is actually a moral advantage, rendering God more respectable and more impressive. Thus, omnipotence is explicitly sacrificed in order to better secure other attributes regarded as ultimately more important.

Is the notion of God as omnipotent coherent and meaningful? Perhaps, but there is no single or obvious way to understand what "omnipotence" means, and there are very good reasons to think that whatever definition is given, it will either contradict with other characteristics or it will be reduced to meaninglessness. Thus, the attribute of omnipotence needs to be treated with some skepticism and care.

God is Omnibenevolent
The concept of "omnibenevolent" stems from two basic ideas of God: that God is perfect and that God is morally good. Therefore, God must possess perfect goodness. Being perfectly good must entail being good in all ways at all times and towards all other beings. This, then, is what it means for God to be omnibenevolent - but there remain questions. First, what is the content of that goodness and second what is the relationship between that goodness and God?

As for the content of that moral goodness, there is quite a bit of disagreement among philosophers and theologians. Some have argued that the basic principle of that moral goodness is love, others have argued that it is justice, and so on. By and large, it seems that what a person believes to be the content and expression of God's perfect moral goodness is highly, if not entirely, dependent upon the theological position and tradition that person is arguing from.

Some religious traditions focus upon God's love, some focus upon God's justice, some focus upon God's mercy, and so on. There is no obvious and necessary reason for preferring any one of these to any other; each is as coherent and consistent as another and none rely upon empirical observations of God which would allow it to claim epistemological precedence.

Another understanding of the concept of omnibenevolence focuses upon a more literal reading of the word: a perfect and complete desire for goodness. Under this explanation of omnibenevolence, God always desires what is good, but that doesn't necessarily mean that God ever actually tries to actualize the good. This understanding of omnibenevolence is often used to counter arguments that evil is incompatible with a God which is omnibenevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent; however, it is unclear how and why a God who desires the good would not also work to actualize the good. It is also difficult to understand how we can label God as "morally good" when God desires the good and is capable of achieving good but doesn't bother to actually try.

When it comes to the question of what sort of relationship exists between God and moral goodness, most discussions are over whether goodness is an essential attribute of God. Many theologians and philosophers have tended to argue that God is indeed essentially good, which means that it is impossible for God either to will evil or to cause evil - everything that God wills and everything that God does is, necessarily, good.

A few have argued contrary to the above that while God is good, God is still capable of doing evil. This argument attempts to preserve a broader understanding God's omnipotence; more importantly, however, it makes God's failure to do evil more laudable because that failure is due to a moral choice. If God does not do evil because God is incapable of doing evil, that would not seem to merit any praise or approval.

Another and perhaps more important debate over the relationship between moral goodness and God revolves around whether moral goodness is independent of or dependent upon God. If moral goodness is independent of God, then God does not define moral standards of behavior; rather, God has simply learned what they are and then communicates them to us.

Presumably, God's perfection prevents him from incorrectly understanding what those standards should be and therefore we should always believe what God informs us of them. Nevertheless, their independence creates a curious alteration in how we understand the nature of God. If moral goodness exists independently of God, where did they come from? Are they, for example, co-eternal with God?

In contrast to this, some philosophers and theologians have argued that moral goodness is entirely dependent upon God. Thus, if something is good, it is only good because of God - outside of God, moral standards simply do not exist. How this came to be so is itself a matter of debate. Are moral standards created by a specific action or declaration of God? Are they a feature of reality as created by God (much as mass and energy are)? There is also the problem that, in theory, raping children could suddenly become morally good if God wished it.

Is the notion of God as Omnibenevolent coherent and meaningful? Perhaps, but only if standards of moral goodness are independent of God and God is capable of doing evil. If God is incapable of doing evil, then to say that God is perfectly good simply means that God is perfectly capable of doing what God is logically restricted in doing - a wholly uninteresting statement. Moreover, if standards of goodness are dependent upon God, then saying that God is good reduces to a tautology.

God is Omniscient
At its most fundamental level, the concept of "omniscience," also sometimes known as all-knowing, refers to God's ability to know absolutely everything. This characteristic is usually treated as a consequence of one of two ways in which God exists: either because God exists outside of time, or because God exists as part of time.

If God exists outside of time, then God's knowledge is also timeless - this means that God knows the past, present, and future simultaneously. One might imagine that God can directly and simultaneously observe the past, present, and future, and this perception of events is what allows God to know it all. If, however, God exists within time as well, then God knows all of the past and present, through direct perception; knowledge of the future, however, is perhaps dependent upon God's ability to infer what will happen based upon God's total knowledge of all factors which lead to the future.

Unfortunately, the most absolute sense of omniscience has been found to be incoherent. If God were truly omniscient in an absolute and unlimited sense, then God could "know" things which are logically impossible to "know." Can God "know" that 2 + 2 = 5, even though that isn't true? Can God "know" what decisions God will make in the future? If God exists within time, then such "knowledge" is logically impossible if God also has free will; because of this, many philosophers and theologians have argued that God can only know that which is logically possible to know.

If omniscience were God's only attribute, the logical limitations might be sufficient; however, other limitations have been found to be necessary because of other attributes which people tend to assume that God has. Without these extra limitations, the definition of God would become logically contradictory, and it would be reasonable to conclude that God, as defined, cannot exist.

For example, can God "know" what it's like for God to play soccer? Some conceptions of gods in the past allowed for them to be able to play sports, but classic philosophical theism has always postulated a non-material, disembodied divinity. Such a god cannot possibly play soccer - an apparent contradiction to omniscience, especially since I am capable of knowing what it's like to play soccer. Any direct experiential knowledge of this sort would thus be problematic - at best, God can know what it's like for others to do these things.

To consider another example, is God capable of "knowing" suffering? Once again, some theistic systems have imagined gods capable of all manner of suffering and privation; philosophical theism, however, has always imagined a perfect God who is beyond such experiences. It is inconceivable to believers in such a god that it would ever suffer - even though humans are obviously quite capable of it.

As a consequence, another common limitation to omniscience which has developed in philosophy and theology is that God can know anything which is compatible with God's nature. Playing soccer is not compatible with the nature of a non-material being. Suffering is not compatible with the nature of a perfect being. Thus, God may not be able to "know" how to play soccer or "know" suffering, but those aren't "really" contradictions with divine omniscience because the definition of omniscience excludes anything contradictory to the nature of the being in question.

If that isn't bad enough, philosophers and theologians have found themselves devising a number of other limitations upon the definition of omniscience in order to allow for many more things which God cannot do while retaining the characteristic of omniscience. For example, it is argued that God's omniscience doesn't include procedural knowledge (knowing how to do things, like ride a bike) or personal knowledge (knowledge derived from personal experience, like "knowing war") - only propositional knowledge (knowledge of true facts). This, however, seems to reduce God to a type of computer storage bank: God contains all facts that exist, but nothing more interesting.

A detailed examination of these and other restrictions should be left for another time; what is important to see here is that "omniscience" has been whittled down bit by bit until there is very little left of the original concept. Arguably, you and I are "omniscient" under some of these "refined" conceptions which have become so weak. Any conception of omniscience which could allow us to argue that we are also omniscient has become irrelevant, especially when combined with the observation that we are capable of knowing a great many things well outside the ability of this allegedly omniscient god.

This shouldn't be all that surprising - philosophers and theologians did not start with an empirical observation that God was omniscient and then proceed to come to terms with how omniscience should be understood in relation to God's other attributes. Such a context, if it existed, would perhaps allow us to be more sympathetic to the shifting sand under their feet.

In reality they began with the religious dogma that God is omniscient and then proceeded to redefine and redefine and then redefine it once again (although these are usually described as "refinements," not redefinitions). This is an effort to harmonize one religious dogma with a series of other religious dogmas which are also redefined until somewhere, someone hopefully arrives at a set of definitions that don't contradict either each other or anything we know about the world, yet are still meaningful. No one has quite succeeded yet, but that's not for want of trying.

Arguably, the original conception of omniscience wasn't very coherent anyway - but as more and more of it is removed in order to make it safe for logic and for God's other alleged attributes, we arrive at a position where there seems little point in continuing to use the term at all. Is God all-knowing or just very knowing? The eventual definition of all-knowing seems to barely distinguishable from very knowing. The term all-knowing cannot be abandoned for religious reasons, but the concept has been all but abandoned in the details.

Is the notion of God as omniscient coherent and meaningful? Perhaps, but because there is no single or obvious way to understand what "omniscience" means there are very good reasons to think that whatever definition is given, it will either contradict with other characteristics or it will be reduced to meaninglessness. Omniscience should be regarded with a very skeptical eye because there is every chance that it could be the undoing of many alleged gods.

God is Provident & Sovereign
Although not usually given much attention in most debates, one critical attribute of God for many believers is the idea that God is "provident," which means that God acts in some fashion that requires God to become involved with humanity and causes the course of human history to be aligned with God's ultimate desires and purposes.

God's providence is directly related to God's perfect moral goodness (because God's ultimate purpose is also perfectly good, otherwise God's interference with human history couldn't be characterized as "provident") and God's omnipotence (thus allowing God the power to become involved). Providence is also sometimes derived from the idea of God as continually sustaining the world through an act of will, thus also ensuring the existence of all the things we need in order to exist ourselves. This conception of God is important for differentiating between classical philosophical theism and deism, a theistic belief system which postulates a creator God who isn't at all involved with the course of human history.

Now, how exactly God becomes involved in human history and what direction the ultimate course humanity will take varies considerably from one religion to another. Indeed, many religions have directly opposing ideas of just what it is God has planned for humanity and how God intends to achieve those plans. Nevertheless, they share in common the more fundamental principle that God is even interested in such matters in the first place and bothers to act in human history in order to bring something in particular to reality.

One of the most serious problems with the divine attribute of providence is the implications it might have for human freedom. After all, if it is certain that God is going to bring about some particular set of results in human history, then there must be at least the theoretical possibility, if not the actual reality, of God interfering with human freedom (to ensure that the plans work out); that, in turn, serves to undermine the principle that humans should be held morally accountable for their actions.

A classic example of this dilemma would be the Old Testament story of how God ensured that the Hebrews would be released from slavery in Egypt. God is portrayed as acting in human history for two purposes: first, to free the Hebrews, and second, to make sure that they knew that their freedom was dependent upon the power and sovereignty of God rather than the benevolence of the Egyptian pharaoh.

To achieve the former, God sent plagues to Egypt in order to intimidate the Egyptians. To achieve the latter, God made sure that whenever the pharaoh was about to be generous and let the Hebrews go, his heart was "hardened" and he refused to release them, thus ensuring that another, even worse plague would be sent the next day. If God had to act and harden the pharaoh's heart, to what extent can we argue that pharaoh was morally responsible for his actions?

Closely related to God's providence is his sovereignty - the idea that God has the authority to act in human history in order to bring it to some desired goal or end. God's sovereignty is traditionally derived from God's attribute as absolute creator. As creator of all existence, God has the right to do with existence and everything in existence whatever God wants. If God desires that some particular state of affairs occur, then God has the right to achieve that state of affairs, even if it means interfering with human freedom and human history.

Are Divine Providence and Divine Sovereignty coherent attributes? They appear to be - it is possible to understand what they mean and they do not appear to contain any internal contradictions. They are also meaningful because they provide real information about God, in the sense that we learn more than we knew before. That does not, however, mean that these attributes are necessarily compatible with other attributes which might be postulated or compatible with known features of the world around us.

God is Free: Constraint vs. Freedom
One attribute which does not receive a lot of individual attention, but which is commonly assumed when discussing other attributes, is the idea that God is absolutely and perfectly free. What this means is that there is a total absence of any constraints or force or limitations on God whenever God acts - for God, freedom is absolute.

Thus, for example, when God created the whole of existence, God was not limited by any environmental constraints or material constraints in how God created things. Thus, everything in existence could be slightly different from how it is currently - anyone who claims that God had to make any feature of the universe in the way it currently is also claiming that God was constrained in how things were created.

This is not to say that God could have made an evil world - that would contradict God's fundamental and absolute goodness. Any constraints which exist for God's freedom are entirely internal. Thus, for example, God is constrained by various aspects of God's nature, like being morally good or being a person.

God's absolute freedom here is more relevant when it comes to non-moral issues - for example, the fact that humans are carbon-based life forms that breathe oxygen. We could have been created as silicon-based life forms that breathe methane. The atomic weights of all of the elements could have been slightly different. Electrons could have been created as positively charged and protons as negatively charged. The very basic structure of existence need not have been made the way it currently is - all could have been different.

God's absolute freedom also exists on an even more fundamental level. In addition to having been able to create everything different from how it currently is, God had the freedom not to create anything at all. God was not required in any fashion to create existence; instead, creation was a free choice made by God because it fulfilled some desire of God's.

Although the concept of divine freedom seems to be internally consistent, it isn't necessarily consistent with other characteristics commonly attributed to God. For example, if God was absolutely free to either create or not create the universe, does that mean that prior to creation God did not know if the universe would exist?

If God didn't know, then God's ability to know the future is very limited and perhaps nonexistent - after all, God never knows if it will ever act in any particular way. To use a rather mundane example, God cannot know if a particular tree will fall at a particular time in the future because God doesn't know if it will cause that tree to fall or not.

On the other hand, if God did know that the universe would exist, and of course there existed no other powers or being that could create the universe, then it was impossible for God not to create the universe. Thus, God's ability to know the future limits, if not eliminates, God's freedom. If God knows that it will not cause a particular tree to fall on a particular date, then God is not free to cause that tree to fall and is also not free to ignore the tree.

If any conception of God is to be judged coherent and meaningful, then conflicts between divine freedom and other attributes like omniscience must be resolved - and such a resolution will necessarily be difficult. It is hard to resolve absolute attributes, and God is just full of absolutes which people try to "refine" - but limiting an absolute while keeping it absolute seems to be a exercise in futility.

God is Immutable: Why can't God change?
Philosophical theism commonly ascribes to God the attribute of "immutable" - the idea that God cannot and does not change. Whatever God is like now is the way that God was for all of the past and the way God will be for all of the future. It doesn't matter what happens anywhere else, God always and inevitably remains the same.

The impetus for this attribute comes from the more fundamental idea of God being perfect. If God is perfect right now, then it would not seem possible for God to change. Any change would either add to God (like learning something new), which suggests that God wasn't really perfect before, or it would take away from God (like forgetting something), which suggests that God would no longer be perfect.

Thus, if God was always perfect in the past, is perfect right now, and will always be perfect in the future, then nothing can either add to or take away from God. It is then concluded that since any change must either take away or add to God, then God must be incapable of ever changing. Although it may not seem obvious that any change would affect God's perfection, it must be remembered that God is absolutely perfect.

The origins of an immutable God lie more in Greek and Neoplatonic ideas about the need for a perfect God than in the ancient Jewish ideas about a God who lives in and acts within human history. Because of this, although the attribute of immutability has been popular, it has also come under serious challenge. It should not be assumed that this popularity has only existed among philosophers - average believers have also been drawn to this idea because an immutable God would seem to offer a stable focal point in a universe filled with changes, often for the worse.

Nevertheless, arguing for an immutable God would seem to remove many of the personal connections between us and God which are the point of arguing for a personal God. How, for example, can we be "made in the image of God" when our existence is so completely unlike God's existence? How can an immutable God understand our fears, our hopes, our dreams? If God's perfection includes immutability and we should be striving for perfection, then perhaps the common sorts of worship services found in Christianity, Judaism, and Islam should be abandoned in favor of something more like the teachings of Buddhist monasteries.

An immutable God cannot learn anything because learning implies change. If God cannot learn anything, then there are things which God will never know (thus conflicting with God's alleged omniscience) or God has always known absolutely everything. That, however, would raise the question of just what the point of creation was.

This is one reason why people have not only rejected the doctrine that God is immutable, but also the general Neoplatonic argument that God must be perfect. This has helped lead to the development of process theism, a theistic position which postulates a God who grows and develops and lives alongside us.

God is Eternal: Timeless vs. Everlasting
God is commonly portrayed as being eternal; however, there is more than one way to understand the concept of "eternal." On the one hand, God may be thought of as "everlasting," which means that God has existed through all of time. On the other hand, God may be thought of as "timeless," which means that God exists outside of time, unconstrained by the process of cause and effect.

The idea that God should be eternal in the sense of timeless is partially derived from the characteristic of God being omniscient even though we retain free will. If God exists outside of time, then God can observe all events throughout the course of our history as if they were simultaneous. Thus, God knows what our future holds without also affecting our present - or our free will.

An analogy of how this might be so was offered by Thomas Aquinas, who wrote that "He who goes along the road does not see those who come after him; whereas he who sees the whole road from a height sees at once all those traveling it." A timeless god is, then, thought to observe the entire course of history at once, just as a person might observe the events along the entire course of a road at once.

A more important basis for defining "eternal" as "timeless" is ancient Greek idea that a perfect god must also be an immutable god. Perfection does not allow for change, but change is a necessary consequence of any person who experiences the changing circumstances of the historical process. According to Greek philosophy, especially that found in the Neoplatonism which would play an important role in the development of Christian theology, the "most real being" was that which existed perfectly and changelessly beyond the troubles and concerns of our world.

Eternal in the sense of everlasting, on the other hand, presumes a God who is part of and acts within history. Such a god exists through the course of time like other persons and things; however, unlike other persons and things, such a god has no beginning and no end. Arguably, an everlasting god cannot know the details of our future actions and choices without impinging upon our free will. Despite that difficulty, however, the concept of "everlasting" has tended to be more popular among average believers and even many philosophers because it is easier to comprehend and because it more compatible with the religious experiences and traditions of most people.

The attribute of "eternal" is one of those where the conflict between the Greek and Jewish heritage of philosophical theism is most obvious. Both Jewish and Christian scriptures point to a God who is everlasting, acting in human history, and very much capable of change. Christian and Neoplatonic theology, however, is often committed to a God who is so "perfect" and so far beyond the type of existence we understand that it is no longer recognizable.

This is perhaps one indicator of an important flaw in the assumptions which lie behind the classical ideas about what constitutes "perfection." Why must "perfection" be something which is beyond our ability to recognize and understand? Why is it argued that just about everything which makes us human and makes our lives worth living something which detracts from perfection?

These and other questions pose serious problems for the stability of the argument that God must be timeless. An everlasting God, however, is a different story. Such a God is more comprehensible; however, the trait of everlasting does tend to conflict with other Neoplatonic traits like perfection and immutable. Either way, assuming that God is eternal is not without problems.

God is Transcendent & Immanent
On the face of it, the characteristics of transcendence and immanence appear to be in conflict. A transcendent God is one who is beyond perception, independent of the universe, and wholly "other" when compared to us. An immanent God, however, is one which exists within - within us, within the universe, etc. - and, hence, very much a part of our existence. But how can these qualities exist simultaneously?

The idea of a transcendent God has roots both in Judaism and in Neoplatonic philosophy. The Old Testament, for example, records a prohibition against idols and this can be interpreted as an attempt to emphasize the wholly "otherness" of God which cannot be represented physically. Neoplatonic philosophy, in a similar manner, emphasized the idea that God is so pure and perfect that it completely transcended all of our categories, ideas, and concepts.

The idea of an immanent God can also be traced to both Judaism and Greek philosophers. The stories of the Old Testament depict a God who is very active in human affairs and the working of the universe. Christians, especially mystics, have often described a God who works within them and whose presence they can perceive immediately and personally. Philosophers have also discussed the idea of a God who is somehow united with our souls, such that this union can be understood and perceived by those who study and learn enough.

The idea of God being transcendent is very common when it comes to the mystical traditions within various religions. Mystics who seek a union or at least contact with God are seeking a transcendent God - a God so totally "other" and so totally different from what we normally experience that a special mode of experience and perception is required. Such a God is not immanent in our normal lives, otherwise mystical training and mystical experiences would not be necessary to learn about God. In fact, the mystical experiences are themselves generally described as "transcendent" and not amenable to the normal categories of thought and language which would allow those experiences to be communicated to others.

Clearly there is some conflict between these two characteristics. The more God's transcendence is emphasized the less God's immanence can be understood and vice-versa. For this reason, many philosophers have tried to downplay or even deny one attribute or the other. Kierkegaard, for example, focused primarily upon God's transcendence and rejected God's immanence - this has been a common position for many modern theologians.

Moving in the other direction we find Protestant theologian Paul Tillich and those who have followed his example in describing God as our "ultimate concern," such that we could not "know" God without "participating in" God. This is a very immanent God whose transcendence is ignored entirely - if, indeed, such a God can be described as transcendent at all.

The need for both qualities can be seen in the other characteristics normally attributed to God. If God is a person and works within human history, then it would make little sense for us not to be able to perceive and communicate with God. Moreover, if God is infinite, then God must exist everywhere - including within us and within the universe. Such a God must be immanent.

On the other hand, if God is absolutely perfect beyond all experience and understanding, then God must also be transcendent. If God is timeless (outside of time and space) and unchangable, then God cannot also be immanent within us, beings who are within time. Such a God must be wholly "other," transcendent to everything we know.

Because both of these qualities follow readily from other qualities, it would be very difficult to abandon either without also needing to abandon or at least seriously modify many other common attributes of God. Some theologians and philosophers have been willing to make such a move, but most have not - and the result is a continuation of both of these attributes, constantly in tension.

God is Incorporeal: Mind without Body?
It is commonly taken for granted that, when talking about God, we are discussing a being who has no body and is not in any way constructed from matter or energy - both of which are features of the "created universe" rather than the "uncreated God." This attribute of incorporeality should not be taken for granted, however, because it has important implications for other divine characteristics.

In many ancient religions, gods were often perceived as having bodies of some sort, even if those bodies differed from the bodies of humans. Even in more philosophical conceptions of God, some unity between God and matter was regarded as a necessary consequence of the belief that the world was somehow an aspect of God. When Greek philosophers began to propose an absolutely perfect God, however, it was concluded that such perfection was not compatible with a material body.

After all, matter and energy have limitations and are susceptible to change - two attributes which philosophers specifically denied as applying to God. Therefore, it was argued that God was not matter, was not energy, and did not have any kind of body - but God was Mind. The idea of God as Mind rather than Body is consistent with the traditional dualist view of Mind and Body being entirely different substances, often accompanied by the further idea that Mind is prior to and superior to Body.

God, of course, is the ultimate Mind - far surpassing in every respect the Mind which we understand ourselves to have. God's actions, God's intentions, and God's will are all extensions of the ultimate incorporeal Mind which lies behind the very structure of our reality. At least, that is the basic idea behind philosophical theism - but does it make any sense?

The premise that God is Mind without Body suffers from many of the same objections raised against the argument that human beings have a dual nature between mind and body. We have no experience of minds without bodies and all scientific evidence points to the conclusion that the existence of mind is dependent upon matter - making the existence of a disembodied mind like God rather unlikely.

Even if a disembodied mind were possible, how could interaction between mind and matter be explained if they really are completely and utterly different kinds of things? How can immaterial Mind affect or change matter in any way? Perhaps we need to postulate some third kind of substance which mediates between Mind and Matter, even between the Mind of God and the matter of the universe - but the more substances beyond mere matter that we have to postulate, the less realistic and reasonable our theories become.

God Exists: Necessary & Self-Existent
It might seem odd to list "existence" as an attribute of God, but that's not actually the point here. Of course believers think that their god exists - what is at issue is how God exists. According to philosophical theism, God exists in a very special and unique way: God's existence is necessary rather than contingent.

This is a particular philosophical differentiation which most people are probably unfamiliar with and certainly never have occasion to use in their daily lives. Nevertheless, it does play an important role in a variety of philosophical discussions, including theological debates.

Most things are regarded as existing contingently, which means that it is possible for them not to exist. Your computer is "contingent" in that its existence relies upon the prior existence of other objects and other processes. It is possible that none of them, however, would have given rise to your computer - thus, it is possible for your computer to never have existed.

Everything in the universe is regarded as "contingent." God, however, is regarded as being who exists in a radically different way. God doesn't depend on anything to exist. There are no prior objects, no prior beings, and no prior processes which gave rise to the existence of God. Being completely independent of everything, God isn't contingent on anything. Thus, God does not exist contingently.

This means that God exists necessarily (this idea is sometimes expressed by saying that God is self-existent or by the Greek term aseity). The idea that God does not depend upon anything else for existence is not the only way to understand the idea of "necessary," however. It is also possible for something to be logically necessary. A logically necessary proposition is one which must be true and cannot be false. The idea that God necessarily exists has been extended to incorporate the idea that God is logically necessary as well.

Therefore, it is argued by many theologians it isn't possible for God not to have existed. We can conceive of the non-existence of computers and tables and planets, but not of God - indeed, the very idea of God not existing is conceived as being logically contradictory. The premise that if God does exist then God must exist plays an important role in the development of the Ontological Argument for the existence of God, first proposed by Anselm of Canterbury.

Being logically necessary does not seem to follow, logically or empirically, from the attribute of existing necessarily. Just because a being is not dependent upon anything for its existence does not appear to allow us to conclude that, therefore, any statement that it does not exist is a logical contradiction. Perhaps because of this many philosophers inclined to accept the first sense of God being necessary have not also accepted the arguments that God is logically necessary.